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ABSTRACT
Public expectations for what constitute responsible practices of mining and other extrac-
tive companies have been evolving and becoming evermore complex. As focal organizations
struggle to come to terms with increased expectation, tools must be developed to assess
performance and, if possible, predict and forecast how their performance will be received by
stakeholders in the future.
The main purpose of this work is to provide a tool for assessing the current state and
longevity of public perceptions of corporations who are already measuring their social per-
formance. This tool should allow managers and other decision makers within a focal orga-
nization to plan for and manage social risk to their operations by giving them a sense of the
potential social outcomes that a specific project may generate. In addition, it may provide
insight to others interested in the social license of a given project, such as governments,
NGO’s, and individual stakeholders and stakeholder groups.
The work provided herein is comprised of an agent-based model of fluctuations in social
license to operate through the use of opinion diffusion and stakeholder network creation.
Agent-based modeling is a bottom-up approach that explores complex macroscopic phenom-
ena through the implementation of simple microscopic rules for the behavior of individual
agents. This method allows researchers to explore and quantify potential outcomes.
The model created for this work demonstrates the change in social license for a group of
stakeholders with a specific distribution of influence and individual consensus levels. Fur-
thermore, it successfully recreates network structures thought to be associated with different
levels of durability of the social license granted by a stakeholder network. These network
structures are analyzed for their stability and ability to self-propagate within the model.
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Minerals are the force behind the high standard of living currently enjoyed by societies
with developed economies. They fuel our travel, power our homes, and transport our food,
not to mention that the majority of all the products we consume are made from a variety of
minerals. The need to extract and process an increasing amount of mineral products comes
as the global population increases and an ever growing number of consumers are created
as nations develop. At the same time, public scrutiny of and expectation for the ethical
behavior of extractive operations is also increasing.
As agents of the corporation, managers have struggled to understand and respond to the
rapid changes in public expectation over the past three decades. This is evidenced by the
vast body of literature on the subjects of business ethics and corporate social responsibility,
and a general lack of agreement on what the social responsibilities of a corporation actually
are and how they should be executed. Even the reasons for the increased interest in corpo-
rate social responsibility remain unclear. This conversation will and should continue to be
ongoing, as minerals continue to be produced and public expectations continue to evolve.
The major hypothesis of this work is that agent-based modeling is a methodology that can
significantly expand the manager’s toolkit for monitoring and forecasting their ability to
manage the expectations of their stakeholders through the use of Social License to Operate
(SLO). Though the primary users of this work are envisioned to be mine managers and other
professionals, it may also provide insight to others interested in the social license of a given
project, such as governments, NGO’s, and individual stakeholders and stakeholder groups.
The tools developed in this dissertation are a set of Agent-Based Models (ABM), which
utilize the bottom-up approach of allowing individual-level decision-making to drive larger
social phenomena. The ability to gain macroscopic information from microscopic interactions
1
is very powerful, as it allows for a wide range of complex behavior to be observed, while
simplifying and minimizing the need for model inputs. The behavior of interest in this work
is the ability of a diverse group of stakeholders to issue a level of social license, and the
durability of that license once it has collectively been decided.
This work constitutes a novel approach to social license durability in the following ways:
• It applies a new scientific methodology (agent-based modeling) to the area of stake-
holder analysis
• It utilizes a new set of algorithms and interactions rules to monitor the interaction of
stakeholders
• These interaction rules are used to produce stakeholder networks which can be analyzed
for social license and stakeholder network outcomes
• The final model has forecasting capabilities; it can give information about the potential
for social license changes from a given set of initial conditions
This thesis has been organized into seven chapters, including the introduction. In chapter
2, the motivation for this research is set forth, including a short history of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) and it’s definitions, and some of the overarching themes and broad
questions that CSR seeks to address. It also includes an exploration of some of the criticisms
of CSR as a business practice. The concept of Social License to Operate (SLO) is also
explored, including some discussion on the advent of SLO as a reaction to public expectation.
The chapter explores the major questions of who issues social license, and to whom social
license is granted. Finally, the systems approach to SLO is elaborated, including concepts
of license levels and boundaries, stakeholder and network analysis, and and introduction to
complex systems as an approach to understanding the mechanisms of SLO.
In chapter 3, we will examine the method of computational complex systems analysis
in its manifestation as agent-based modeling. The history of the method is laid out, with
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some of the major developments being highlighted. The general architecture of the method
is then discussed, including definitions of agents, environment, variables, and an overview of
the modeling cycle. Some of the applications of ABM are described as a precursor to the
specific application represented by this work.
Chapter 4 is concerned with the primary model created for this research. The purpose
of the primary model is to explore how the social license issued by individual stakeholders
can change based on individual stakeholder interactions. Interaction rules for this model are
based on the diffusion of information through repeated contact of agents, in which opinion is
transferred and the social license of the group as a whole may be inferred by the emergence
of patterns of individual levels of consent. The mechanism for diffusion of opinion from
one agent to another is the differential influence between two interacting agents. Two types
of agent were originally proposed, and case studies were performed to prove the internal
consistency of the program, as well as to validate the model through its ability to produce
an expected result. Following a discussion of the results of the primary model, several
enhancements were proposed to increase the complexity of the model and provide more
nuanced rules for the interactions. The major proposed enhancement to the primary model
is the addition of reciprocity in order to produce mutual interaction as agents exchange
opinion with each other instead of just having opinion dictated from one agent to the other.
The enhanced model was subjected to a further case study to ensure the continuation of
internal consistency. The case study tested two sets of initial conditions, and the results
include average distributions of agents over the license and influence variables. Also included
is a discussion of the time required by the model for a consensus to emerge.
The primary model is further enhanced in chapter 5, in which a new level of complexity is
introduced in the form of network links that tie interacting agents in the overall stakeholder
network. A brief discussion of network characteristics is given in order to explain the addi-
tion of network logic to the model. Several metrics used in measuring network properties
are explained, including density, clustering, and centrality. Different metrics of centrality
3
are explored, which includes a discussion types of network flow, which is an essential con-
sideration when choosing a metric for analysis or use in agent decision making. The actual
enhancements to the model are then set forth. The centrality measure of Freeman degree
is used by agents to determine the influence of individual agents dynamically, rather than
having them set a priori. Because the mechanism for opinion transfer is the differential in-
fluence of two agents, an “equivalent influence” scheme is introduced as a means to provide
interaction rules for agents who have no difference in influence and would otherwise not
interact. A case study was run to determine the effect that the equivalent influence scheme
has on the behavior of the model and the results are then discussed. The concept of decay is
set forth as a mechanism for the disappearance of links from the network in order to balance
the formation of links that occurs as agents interact. Finally, the evolution of one network
into another is discussed, and the implications of such evolutions on the network’s ability to
issue and maintain a social license is considered.
Chapter 6 provides a discussion of some of the significant findings of the model tests,
including the stability of networks that are produced. Some of the networks are very robust,
and act as boundary reference points for the other structures. Some structures are self-
sustaining within a narrow set of parameters, and some structures are unstable and merely
act as transitory states as the network develops from one structure to another. A discussion
is also included on how the scaling of one variable affects another, and the probability of
agent interaction and link formation. The scaling of variables also applies to the number of
agents in the model as the probability of interaction changes depending on the number of
agents available for interaction.
Finally, chapter 7 recaps some of the major contributions of this work to conceptual space
of CSR and SLO, and sets forth possible directions for further research, including feedback




STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS AND SOCIAL LICENSE TO OPERATE
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a topic has a broad spectrum of opinions, defi-
nitions, applications, and political and economic implications associated with it. While it is
not the aim of this work to debate the ethics or efficacy of CSR, a discussion of the theoret-
ical foundation and the benefits, critiques, and challenges associated with CSR (especially
in its manifestation as Social License to Operate) is necessary in order to understand the
potential uses and benefits of the models that are proposed in later chapters.
2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
The concept of CSR has been evolving for more than 50 years, and has woven together
themes from different areas of business ethics1. The term “Corporate Social Responsibility”
has become an emblem for the whole debate about the proper or desired role of business in
society. It is generally thought of as an attempt by industry to react to an ever-increasing
public expectation of what companies should provide for society [2, 3]. In turn, the public’s
expectation seems to be a reaction to the risks and costs to communities because of bad
practices [4–6]. Speaking specifically about oil and gas development, Jaquet points out
several risks that communities face in their potential interactions with corporations, such as
rapid industrialization and its associated problems, uneven distribution of costs and benefits,
inter-community conflict, and social-psychological stress [7]. A satisfactory definition of CSR
has not yet emerged, partially because from the early days of CSR there has been debate
about what the moral responsibility of the corporation is, if it has one at all. Friedman
famously argued that the social responsibility of the corporation is to maximize profits, and
that any attempt at social work by companies is unethical because it requires an agent of the
corporation (executives, management, etc.) to spend money that belongs to stakeholders,
1for a thorough history of CSR, see Carroll, 1999 [1]
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on projects that don’t represent the interest of the stockholders [8]. Other authors see the
concept of CSR as being a pro-business attempt to justify expansion into vulnerable markets,
while escaping the policing of government by appealing to the idea of self-enforcement of
internal standards that are beyond the expectation of government [9, 10]. One general
definition, put forward by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, is as
follows:
Corporate Social Responsibility is the continuing commitment by business to
behave ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the
quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community
and society at large [11].
This definition captures many ideals that are central to the concept of CSR, such as economic
development and quality of life of the workforce, focusing both on the community, and
society. It neglects, however, the business-case for CSR, which deals with the motivations
of business in participating in social improvement. This motivation was well summarized by
Bhattacharya and Sen:
not only is “doing good” “the right thing to do,” but it also leads to “doing
better” through its positive effects on key stakeholder groups [12].
Making a “business case” for CSR is one of the major challenges faced by CSR practitioners.
The business case is most usually related to reducing or eliminating the costs associated
with things like staff time spent on conflict management and operating time lost due to
occupation or strikes [13, 14]. Porter and Kramer suggested the idea of Creating Shared
Value (CSV) as an alternative to CSR that creates growth of both the local economy and
company profits by taking advantage of connections that exist between social and economic
progress [15]. This idea appeals to neoliberals, by presenting the free market as a moral
neutral that is actually a dormant force for moral good that just needs to be let free to cure
the ills of society without compromising its ability to do what it does best; make profit.
6
Several criticisms of CSV are leveled by Crane et al. (ibid.), perhaps the most compelling of
which is the failure of CSV to address the tensions that exist between social and economic
goals as these goals come into competition with each other.
One example of the tension that may exist between social and economic goals is captured
by Gardner in the form of what she terms, “disconnect development” [16]. Disconnect
development occurs when a company uses the rhetoric of partnership to actually distance
themselves from local risks while maintaining the benefits of creating compliance within the
community and creating a CSR “performance” for their global audience of shareholders.
This happens because tension exists between the social goals of meaningful engagement
with community stakeholders competes with the economic goals of minimizing risk and
expenditure on social projects. Appel and Rajak document similar happenings as mining
and oil and gas companies use infrastructure in one case and HIV/AIDS treatment in the
other as a material and symbolic frame in which to abdicate social responsibility [10, 17].
In this situation, Gardner suggests that the company should become more involved with
the community–even to the extent that they intervene in local governance by “pressing the
governments they work with for greater transparency in their dealings”–in order to pursue
the social goal, at the expense of the economic goal. But social and economic goals are not
the only forces in tension.
It is also possible to see this kind of disconnect happening because of the competition
of multiple social goals–Gardner points out the paradox that in order for development to
be sustainable, the development must be able to continue even as the “donor” or “patron”
symbolized by the company inevitably withdraws. In order to support the argument that
companies must engage in a more permanent relationship with local communities, Gard-
ner casts up sustainability as the “holy grail” of contemporary development work as an
unattainable ideal to be replaced with a more realistic patron/beneficiary relationship be-
tween business and local stakeholders. As will be discussed in the next section, Boutilier
hypothesizes that this kind of patron/beneficiary relationship may be a characteristic of a
7
low level of social license in which interactions are characterized by a transactional relation-
ship in which support is conditional on a flow of benefits and companies keep communities at
arm’s length [18]. This is backed up by Zandvliet’s assertion that, “when companies do not
engage with communities on a long-term basis, communities pressure companies for short-
term gains” [19]. According to this view, the kind of disconnect development that Gardner
discusses is an early stage of social license that must be worked through in order to achieve
higher trust and reciprocity among the stakeholder community.
2.2 Social License to Operate (SLO)
The term Social License to Operate (SLO) was originally used in the context of the mining
industry by Jim Cooney of Placer Dome as a metaphor for the mining industry’s need to
improve its reputation after a period of intense public scrutiny following some high-profile
social and ecological disasters which left public trust of the mining industry at an extreme
low [20]. It is agreed that the concept of SLO emerged from this type of public scrutiny,
though it is interesting to note that who or what was responding and being responded to, as
well as the reasons for the response are debated. Owen and Kemp view it as a response to
opposition and a mechanism to ensure the viability of the sector through the manipulation
of stakeholders, whereas Prno and Slocombe assert that it was a response to demands by
communities for a greater share of benefits and increased involvement in decision making
[3, 21]. Whatever the reason, the idea behind SLO is that full compliance with law has
become insufficient to satisfy society’s expectation for mineral extraction companies; now it
is necessary to receive social permission from the communities and stakeholders who most are
heavily affected by the extraction process [22]. SLO is a way of measuring the perception of
stakeholders about whether their expectations are being met. Due to the nature of changing
circumstances and changing opinions, SLO is a dynamic and non-permanent form of consent,
which must be constantly monitored and cultivated for as long as a project is in operation.
There are several interesting features that define SLO as a subset of the larger research
area of CSR. There are also several salient questions that are currently being addressed and
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explored in the literature, such as: who issues social license? Is it a cohesive group, or a
collection of individuals? If it is a group, who is included in the group? If it is individuals,
which individuals are the most dominant in the decision to issue license? To whom is it
granted? What does social license look like? How is it tracked and measured? How does it
change over time? What factors contribute to the granting or denial of the social license?
How is it tracked and measured? Is it possible to forecast probabilistic outcomes for future
social license? To the degree that these questions have been addressed in the literature, some
potential answers will be given in this section.
The first set of questions to be explored pertain to the identity of the grantors of SLO,
and appeals to the area of stakeholder theory for answer2. The main challenge of stakeholder
theory is that of stakeholder identification, which is recognized by critics and proponents alike
[9, 24–27]. In stakeholder theory, a stakeholder is defined as an actor that either affects, has
potential to affect, is affected by, or has potential to be affected by a given project or issue
[27]. This means that identification and classification of stakeholders is crucial in order
to ensure the proper understanding of relevant stakeholders and the legitimate issuance of
social license. Identification of stakeholders can be a complex process, partially because
of what Thomson and Boutilier call, “the fiction of community as an entity,” and what
Welker calls the “enactment of the corporation” [20, 28]. These ideas of corporate and
community enactment revolve around the fact that groups, institutions, and organizations
are not cohesive, coherent, homogenous entities unto themselves, but in fact are made up
of individual agents with different values, ideals, and visions for the direction and future
of their organizations. In Welker’s work, the corporation is conceptualized as departments
contending for the finite resources that are collectively held, and decisions made by the firm
are actually the result of the dynamics of this internal competition. Kemp and Owen cite
this as a reason that CSR is not yet a core competence of the mining industry because,
according to them (and corroborated by Welker), the CSR department of a company is
2For a review of the history and some applications of stakeholder theory, see Brugha and Varvasovsky [23].
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often seen as an auxiliary appendage that is pushing the agenda of community relations
onto other departments [29]. Kemp and Owen go on to say that the pattern of relegating
CSR underestimates the sustained negative impact on social performance of the corporation.
Boutilier applies this concept to an even larger scope, examining the idea that because of the
disconnected nature of departments within a company, single operations within a company
of multiple operations, companies within an industry, and an industry within a sector, social
license may be granted to one part and withheld from another (e.g. a department is granted
social license while the larger operation is not, or vice versa) [30]. The interaction of distinct
corporate agents deals with the question of who is seeking the social license, or to whom
the license is granted. In other words, it is related to the question of identification of
the focal organization. This is important, because it is necessary to understand that the
solicitation and granting of social license is done at the intersection between management
(CSR department) and community, which means that the tools for identifying, categorizing,
and forecasting the behavior of stakeholders are used by managers, and therefore must be
useful to them specifically [25, 31]. The question of who the other stakeholders are is related
to the “fiction of community as an entity,” as noted above.
One current approach to stakeholder identification is found in the methodology of systems
analysis and network theory. According to Boutilier:
To combine social networks with stakeholder theory it is only necessary to restrict
membership in the network to stakeholders. Then the network is defined by the
significance of stakes rather than by the nebulous notion of a ‘community’. The
stakeholder network replaces the community as the grantor of the social license
but the actual measurement of the social license granted is done at the level of
the individual stakeholder groups that are the members of the network. There is
no assumption that the stakeholder network can or should speak with one voice.
The degree to which its members agree on the level of social license that should
granted becomes an empirical question with a plainly visible answer. Network
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graphs quickly reveal whether or not there are cohesive clusters of stakeholders
that grant or withhold the social license. Network graphs can also show to what
extent the project’s supporters or opponents are isolated, clustered, or central to
the main component of the network. It quickly becomes obvious which ones are
more influential and what levels of social license they grant. Debates about which
groups or clusters of organisations represent the true views of the ‘community’
become irrelevant because the stakeholder network approach dispenses with the
frequently false assumption that there is only one view [18].
There are several methods within network and stakeholder theory for identifying stakehold-
ers. The first method relies on the local knowledge of experts within the focal organization
to generate a list of stakeholders as perceived by the mine. This often leads to some stake-
holders being marginalized because they are not acknowledged or considered by the manager
to be difficult to manage [9]. Cragg and Greenbaum find that physical stakeholders are often
included, while ideological stakeholders are disregarded [25]. This method, while providing
an incomplete picture of who is included as a stakeholder, provides the starting point for
what is known as “snowball sampling”. In snowball sampling, the initial stakeholder list is
asked to identify other people and organizations that they consider to have a stake in the
issue. This can help to find some of the hidden stakeholders by removing, or at least modify-
ing the biases that lead to the original stakeholder list. The main deficiency of this method
is that the resultant stakeholder list may be a product of stakeholders who form a limited
network, and therefore are unaware of stakeholders belonging to a different component of the
network. This modified list can be further updated by using the “key informant method”,
in which stakeholder nominations come from well connected members of the domain, who
may not have a stake in the issue themselves. This includes figures such as religious leaders,
merchants, medical professionals, and others that are likely to interact with people from
different socio-economic strata, and thus, able to identify stakeholders that may have been
missed by the previous lists. Having a complete list, it is then important to classify stake-
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holders according to the level of social license that they issue, as well as according to their
level of influence in the overall stakeholder network. The level of social license issued may be
determined by managers based on the level that stakeholders issued in the past, or it may be
self-reported through sampling methods such as surveys, interviews, etc. The classification
of stakeholders by influence level is outlined below.
Mitchell et al. propose a framework for classifying stakeholder influence according to
their power, urgency, and legitimacy [26]. This framework was adapted by Chevalier and
Buckles to replace urgency with interest [32]. Interest, in this context, can be thought of as
the “stake” that an individual stakeholder has in a given project. This taxonomy allows for
the delineation of different types of stakeholder according to Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Types of stakeholder based on power, interest, and legitimacy. Adapted from
Mitchell et al. by Chevalier and Buckles[26, 32].
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As the figure shows, the level of influence or importance of a stakeholder in this taxonomy
can be attributed to its possession of a combination of power, interest, and legitimacy. Power
is defined as access to resources that allow a stakeholder to act upon its interests. Interest
is the stake or level of potential to be affected that a stakeholder has in a given issue or
project. Legitimacy is the credibility that a stakeholder has to a claim in a given issue. The
taxonomy shown in Figure 2.1 is the basis for the influence levels of agents in the ABM
model, which will be discussed in chapter 4. The determination of which stakeholders fall
into which influence category is part of the stakeholder definition stage, which must be done
through the local knowledge of the focal organization or as part of the process in which
stakeholders are initially identified. A framework for categorizing stakeholders according to
these classifications is given by Chevalier and Buckles [32].
Once stakeholders are identified and classified, the overall level of social license that
the stakeholder group issues can be assessed based on the individual social license issued,
weighted by the overall centrality of influence of that individual stakeholder within the group.
There are many suggested frameworks within the literature about the best way to monitor
the SLO and CSR performance of a company. Some prefer reporting initiatives or global
standards, while others advocate for the use of more localized and contextual measures [33,
34]. Some assert that compliance with strict government regulations is the most causal link
between standards and social accountability [35]. The conceptual framework of social license
levels and boundaries used in this work is that proposed by Thomson and Boutilier in the
SME Mining Engineering handbook, which is a methodology of local sampling and empirical
observation over time. The structure of social license levels hypothesized by Thomson and
Boutilier are visualized in Figure 2.2.
These SLO levels form the basis of the agent-based SLO levels that will be discussed in
chapter 4, and the relationship between these two metrics is shown inTable 2.1.
The contribution of individual stakeholder social license to the overall level of social
license is determined by certain features and characteristics of the stakeholder network. A
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Figure 2.2: Social license levels and boundary criteria [20].
Table 2.1: Theoretical and Agent-based SLO levels.
Theoretical SLO levels ABM SLO levels






more thorough discussion of network theory and measures is given in chapter 5. For this
section, we will limit the level of network analysis to the features of closure and core-periphery
structure. It is hypothesized that these features determine the durability or resilience of the
social license; closure, by determining the extent to which stakeholders are connected to each
other and therefore able to organize and communicate, and core-periphery by determining
the extent to which the social license of the most dominant stakeholders represent the social
license of the less dominant stakeholders. Figure 2.3 shows the template structure proposed
by Boutilier for social license durability [27]. The social license issued by network type is
believed to go from less durable in the bottom left (no organization) to more durable in the
top right (accountable leadership).
Figure 2.3: Social license durability as a function of network structure type [27]
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2.3 The Role of Complex Systems in SLO
Complex systems (discussed more thoroughly in chapter 3) are systems whose charac-
teristics are emergent, dynamic, and often probabilistic [36]. The application of complex
systems analysis is the cutting edge of SLO research. It has already been used to explore
some of the factors that lead to granting or withdrawal of SLO in mining applications. For
example, Prno and Slocombe recently advanced a novel systems-based framework for assess-
ing SLO determinants and outcomes [37]. They discuss four possible stable states of SLO,
namely:
1. SLO granted and the mine proceeds
2. SLO withheld and the mine proceeds
3. SLO granted and the mine does not proceed
4. SLO withheld and the mine does not proceed
The authors also discuss some of the reasons that each of these states could be reached,
in order to understand more fully the resilience of SLO. The next step is to involve compu-
tational complex systems architecture (such as agent-based modeling) to identify additional
determinants, and forecast the durability of the SLO in order to improve the performance of
extractive companies in their efforts to practice CSR. Some efforts have already been made in
this direction [38, 39]. A large body of literature has shown the care that must be exercised
when using technical tools to solve social problems, or else the products and artifacts that
are produced will have no contextual use, and therefore be of little worth to the CSR field
[9, 40–42]. Because of this, it is crucial that the reader understands that these tools are ide-
ally to be used by managers in a larger holistic approach to stakeholder engagement. With
that in mind, complex systems offer a range of possibilities for understanding the causes,
effects, and long-term outcomes of SLO. An extended discussion of the use of computational




Modeling has long been used as a means of simplifying complex phenomena through
the use of analogy. There are mathematical models, sociological models, ethical models,
biological models, chemical models–models for every branch and discipline imaginable. In
any type of modeling, the goal is often not to perfectly reproduce a “real” object, but to
understand some aspect of a whole by examining the underlying phenomena. There are many
different types of models with a wide range of applications. There are many types of models,
including qualitative–as in Bohr’s model of the atom–analytical–characterized by explicit
formulas that describe a phenomenon–or quantitative, as in the numerical methods used to
understand fluid flow. Models are useful tools that allow us to contextualize phenomena and
behavior that is not well understood into something familiar, or at least tractable. Each
type of model has its usefulness, and the type of model to use depends largely on what
being modeled. The subject of this dissertation is agent-based modeling, a specific kind of
computational model that uses qualitative and quantitative information at a microscopic
level to produce information about a system at a macroscopic or aggregate level. It is useful
for modeling systems that have no analytical solution, multiple scales of manifested behavior,
and heterogeneous constitutive parts. Nigel Gilbert laid out some of the potential advantages
of ABM:
ABM allows modelers to represent in a natural way multiple scales of analysis,
the emergence of structures at the macro level for individual action, and various
kinds of adaptation and learning, none of which is easy to do with other modeling
approaches [43].
This kind of “bottom up” approach is concerned with how complex macro-level behavior can
emerge from simple micro-level rules. In this chapter, we will explore some of the early agent-
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based models in an effort to understand how these models are organized, what they require
or how they are characterized, and the kind of emergent phenomena that they produce. It
should be noted here that there are many variables and contextual specificities involved in
determining and understanding a the dynamics between companies and stakeholders. In any
kind of modeling it is necessary to narrow the possible variables in order for the model to be
computationally manageable. This means that not all of the relevant variables are necessarily
included in a given model, which represents one particular approach to knowledge creation.
Understanding the limitations of modeling as a methodology is necessary in order for mine
managers and others to correctly use the proposed model and interpret it’s results.
3.1 Evolution of ABM
The earliest manifestations of agent-based modeling was in the form of cellular automata
(CA). The idea of CA came from the famous question, “could a machine be programmed to
make a copy of itself,” or, could a man-made object be created that was complex enough to
contain all of the information necessary for its own replication [44]? This question prompted
much thought on the ability of organisms to self organize more complex forms of life. Even-
tually mathematician John Conway proposed his “Game of Life” as an exploration of the
concept of the self-replication of simple structures [45]. This is a good starting point to
examine the way that complex behaviors may emerge from simple rules. In Conway’s game,
there is an initial grid of cells, which have a random binary state of being either “alive”
or “dead” (on or off, black or white, etc.) (Figure 3.1). The state of each cell in the next
“move” or timestep is determined by its current state. There are three simple rules that
decide the next state:
1. Every “alive” cell with two or three neighbors will remain alive in the next step
2. Every “alive” cell with more than three or less than two neighbors will die in the next
step
3. Every “dead” cell with three “alive” neighbors will become alive in the next step
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Figure 3.1: Game of Life: initial state
As each timestep passes, the cells have an opportunity to change, and very quickly certain
patterns start to emerge. Figure 3.2 shows a run of the game after only 27 timesteps. Stable
structures emerge, including blocks (Figure 3.3(a)) and behives (Figure 3.3(b)). As the
model develops (Figure 3.4), the areas of random change (Figure 3.3(c)) are minimized, and
more stable structures are produced, as well as some semi-stable self-replicating structures
such as blinkers (Figure 3.3(d)) and gliders (Figure 3.3(e)). Blinkers are structures that
alternate between horizontal and vertical in each timestep due to the vertical end-cells dying
and horizontal end-cells being born (and vice versa). Gliders are structures that likewise
alternate forms, but the alternating action causes them to move across the board until they
meet some other structure.
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Figure 3.3: Life structures
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Figure 3.4: Game of Life: developed
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This early and rudimentary model shows one of the major features that characterizes
agent-based modeling: that of emergent phenomena. Emergent phenomena are macroscopic
outcomes that are observed, but would not be expected based on the rules of interaction. In
other words, emergent phenomena are complex behaviors that come from simple rules. The
ability to produce such complex behavior from such simple rules is one of the major strengths
of ABM as a method, as it allows the modeler to observe the evolution of complexity, while
only requiring simple rules to be defined.
Even though the outcomes of the “game of life” model have little real world application,
the model demonstrates an important mathematical concept. An application of this concept
was shown soon after with a slightly more elaborate model proposed by Thomas Schelling [46,
47]. Schelling was trying to understand how racial segregation of neighborhoods occurred,
despite the fact that there was no longer any top-down legal enforcement of segregation. He
proposed another simple model, an extension of the the cellular automata model, in which
self-contained, autonomous agents were able to move from one cell to another in order to
meet their preference for having similar neighbors. Agents were divided into two colors,
randomly distributed throughout the grid (Figure 3.5), and again the agents had three rules
to govern their behavior:
1. Each agent calculates the number of neighbors that have the same color.
2. If the number of neighbors with the same color is greater than their preference for
similarity, then the agent stays in their cell.
3. If the number of neighbors with the same color is less than their preference for similarity,
then they move to a cell in which their preference is satisfied.
Not surprisingly, Schelling found that when agents had a high preference for similarity
among their neighbors, they became completely segregated from each other (Figure 3.6).
What was surprising was that even with a relatively low preference for neighbor similarity
(say, 33%) the agents would still self-segregate into distinct neighborhoods, even if the phe-
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Figure 3.5: Schelling segregation: initial state
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nomena was more localized. This again shows emergence, as the outcome is not necessarily
implied by the rules, nor is it consistent with the objective of the individual. This model
also furthers the earlier work in cellular automata as the model provides some insight into
the real-world phenomena of spontaneous segregation into groups based on sameness [48].
Figure 3.6: Schelling segregation: 75% preference for similarity
3.2 Model Architecture
Further advancement of the method of ABM was made as computational architecture
improvements were developed and incorporated. For instance, the addition of discrete event
simulation to ABM provided the framework for coordinating interactions, while object ori-
ented programming allowed for the organization of agents into classes based on their behavior
[49]. These advances in computer science made it possible to develop some of the features
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Figure 3.7: Schelling segregation: 33% preference for similarity
26
that will be described below, including the ability of agents to learn, and the prospect of
ABM’s with multiple types of agents. In addition to these computing features, several soft-
ware packages have been developed for the specific purpose of agent based modeling. Some
of these suites include Swarm, Mason, Repast, and Netlogo. Mason, Swarm and
Repast all utilize some form of the Java programming language, but Netlogo has devel-
oped its own internal language. Netlogo was chosen for this work for its ease of use and
extensive documentation.
3.3 Model Characteristics
While there is a wide range of applications for ABM, there are several characteristics
that all have in common, which constitute the core of what ABM is. There are several
good references for newcomers to ABM, which lay out modeling techniques, characteristics
of ABM, definitions and terminology. Macal and North have produced a guide specifically
aimed at corporate managers who hope to use ABM to optimize their production streams
and better understand their markets [50]. A discussion of the historical evolution of agents in
computational economics is given by Chen [51]. Railsback and Grimm have a textbook to be
used by teachers in ABM classes [49]. Introductory works on ABM for more general audiences
was written by Gilbert and Axelrod and Tesfatsion have a guide for those approaching ABM
from social science perspective. [43, 52]. All of these references have outlined the general
concepts and characteristics of ABM. For convenience, a few will be discussed here.
3.3.1 Agents
All agent-based models have at least some form of agent. The definition of agents can be
somewhat ambiguous, as there is no universally accepted definition in the literature, beyond
the property of autonomy. Macal and North provide a helpful list that covers most of the
important features of agents, as well as some that are possible, but not necessary [53]:
• Agents must be self-contained. This means that every agent is a distinct individual
that has boundaries and is uniquely identifiable as a discrete entity.
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• Agents must be autonomous. It must be able to interact with other agents and the
environment in a way that is completely self-directed. This requires the writing of rules
that allow agents to sense their surroundings and make decisions.
• Agents have variables that define their state at any given time. The variability in
states from one agent to another allow for heterogeneity, and are required for agents
to make decisions as they interact.
• Agents must be social, meaning that they must interact influence/be influenced by
other agents. This happens as interactions force the change of agents’ state variables.
Part of the agents ability to sense means that they have to be able to recognize the
state traits of other agents, at least on a local level.
In addition to these requirements, Macal and North describe the following optional fea-
tures:
• Agents may learn and adapt. This happens by having internal rules that allow for a
different set decisions to be made for a different variable state. As agents interact and
change state, they can also change the rules that will define their next interaction.
• Agents may be goal directed. For example, agents may try to optimize their their
search for potential interaction partners. This is another form of learning that allows
agents to assess the extent to which their behavior is helping to achieve their goals.
• Agents may be heterogeneous. This means that not only can agents have multiple
states, but that there can be completely different kinds of agents with a completely
different set of variables, different objectives, and different rules. This can be a par-
ticular strength of ABM, as many other types of modeling require the simplifying
assumption that all elements are homogenous.
These defining features allow agents to have all the functionality that may be required.
28
3.3.2 Rules
Agents, acting as autonomous individuals, need to have some kind of directive to per-
form in order to fulfill the requirement to interact and change their state. These rules can
be extremely simple, as in the examples of Conway and Schelling given above, or can be
themselves more complex. For example, it is possible to not only have rules for the behavior
of the agents, but also to have rules about rules, or procedures that determine what set of
rules gets followed by an agent at a given time or in a given situation. There are also rules
about the thresholds that may prompt a change in the state variables of agents [54]. In
chapter 4, rules are described for the interaction of agents of the same type and a different
set of rules is given for the interaction of different types of agents.
In addition to rules that govern different types of interactions for different types of agent
or situation, there can also be rules for how an agent learns from its experience. Genetic
algorithms and neural networks are two popular methods of machine learning, as is fuzzy
logic [55–57]. These schemes allow agents to change their internal rules to respond to new
types of stimuli and adapt as stimuli become familiar and allow for an even greater level of
complexity to be explored.
3.3.3 Environment
One of the major caveats for interaction is that agents only be able to sense local agent and
environment information. This is to ensure that the model does not become over-constrained
in a way that produces deterministic behavior. What constitutes proximity is a question of
the agent’s envrionment. The locality of the information doesn’t necessarily need to be a
physical proximity, as agents connected by a network link can be considered “neighbors” even
if they occupy opposing sides of an interaction grid. An important consideration in designing
an agent-based model is the “topology,” or how locality is defined. In the cellular automata
example of Conway, a “Von Neumann” topology is applied, in which agents are actually the
cells themselves, and have a fixed set of eight bordering cells that constitute a neighborhood.
29
In the Schelling example, agents are able to move around in a two-dimensional space known
as a “Euclidean” topology. Network models have their own topology, in which proximity
is defined by the network distance or geodesic path length (described in chapter 5) of two
agents. Other topologies include Geographic Information Systems (GIS), in which actual
geographic information is overlaid on the interaction space and agent movement is restricted
by physical geographic features, and aspatial or “soup” topology, in which proximity is
randomly assigned as two agents are randomly pulled out of a “soup” of agents for an
interaction, and then put back to be randomly drawn again.
Topology is not the only defining characteristic of the model environment. The cells
themselves can be considered a stationary type of agent with their own state that elicits
a response from agents that move to them. For instance, in another model created by
the author, patches or cells represented the spatial location of different energy sources.
Specific patches had a specific kind (wind, solar, fossil) and amount (2MW, etc) of energy
production potential. As agents moved around the interaction space, their goal was to
prospect for energy, and build the most efficient transmission line to transport power back
to their patches of origin. Not only did patches have energy potential, but also a “rent”
associated with building a transmission line on them, and agents built the most efficient lines
by building the shortest path while also minimizing rent. Figure 3.8 shows the interaction
environment of this model, in which agents interact with the environment itself, rather than
other agents.
3.4 Applications
As already demonstrated by the examples used in this chapter, agent-based modeling has
a wide range of applications in various areas of study. Depending on what is being modeled,
agents can represent people, institutions, atomic particles, animals, fluids, sand grains, etc.
Some examples of ABM applications are given in Table 3.1.
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Figure 3.8: Power grid model with environmental interaction
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Mandated land use changes in
Vietnam [60]
Modeling the size of wars [61]
Transport policy and infrastructure
measures [62]
Political institutions and sorting of
citizens based on affiliation [63]
Reform programs in East Asia [64]
Ecology
Employing social norms in energy
conservation [65]




Social norm evolution [68]
Modeling of civil violence [69]
The standing ovation problem [70]
Network
Opinion stability with opportunistic
agents [71]







3.5 ABM of Information Diffusion
There is one specific application that deserves special attention in the context of this
work, and that is the application of diffusion of information in agent-based systems. The
literature listed above in the “information diffusion” category constitutes a specific kind
of ABM with the specific goal of studying how various types of information, innovation,
stereotyping, emotion, and ideas are spread through a group of individual agents. This work
forms the basis for the primary model presented in the next chapter. It includes rules that
other authors have used to govern interactions in these types of systems, and these rules were
carefully considered in the process of choosing rules for the models represented in this work.
Information diffusion is a concept that has received much attention from the agent-based




AGENT-BASED MODEL OF OPINION DIFFUSION
The first step in creating an agent-based model is to identify the behavior of interest and
to define the identity and features of the stakeholders to be modeled as agents. Once those
elements are defined, a simple model can be created to which complexity can be added a
step at a time until the system of interest is satisfactorily represented.
In this work, the problem that the primary model (described below) set out to solve is
as follows: a mining company wants to gain social license to use some land for waste storage
with the possibility of recovering ore from the waste in the future. The company purchased
the land and has the approval of the community to store waste there. There are, however,
several individuals in the community who have traditionally used this land for grazing, and
feel that they should be further compensated for the use of the land. The company wants
to gain social license with dissenters and solidify the license that it already has with other
community members before they begin to use the land. This is done by building consensus
through diffusion of opinion among the community.
In the most simplistic case, the focal organization needs to know how many of their CSR
employees are needed in the community in order to reach a favorable consensus in a given
time frame, or how long it would take to reach consensus with a given number of people as
representatives. A more complex case involves how the company—as a single stakeholder
within a large and complex web of relationships and interests—affects and is affected by the
community in a way maximizes the fulfillment of stakeholder expectations and interests. In
order to go from the most simplistic case to the much more complex case the model that was
originally envisioned has undergone some major changes, which have been carefully chosen
and tested in order to deepen the complexity of the model and enrich the interpretations of
the results. The aim of this chapter is to introduce the agents, variables, and interaction
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rules that define the system of interest, and explore the changes that have been made to the
model as the definitions and questions were refined over the course of this research.
4.1 Primary Opinion Diffusion Model
4.1.1 Agents, Variables, and Environment
The primary version of the model started out with two classes of agent: community
members and employees in the CSR department of the mine. The community agents have
internal state variables that determine their overall acceptance of the mine project and status
within the community. Definitions of these variables are as follows:
License This attribute is variable in time, and is one of the main points of interest for
the model. The “license” variable is used as a measure of individual judgement
on the company’s Social License to Operate. Each agent is placed into one of 5
license categories: high blocker, blocker, neutral, supporter, and high supporter,
with the former categories having the least approval for the mining project and
the latter having the most. For the purposes of modeling, each category is given
a numerical integer value ranging from -2 (high blocker) to +2 (high supporter).
The license of a community agent is a “dummy” variable that is tied to the
opinion variable for that agent
Opinion Opinion is the information that each agent uses to form their license. It is trans-
ferred between agents according to the interaction rules, which differ depending
on what kind of agents are interacting (see below). As agents accumulate a
predefined amount of opinion their license variable changes to reflect their new
opinion. Opinion can be both positive and negative with regard to the mine. As
agents accumulate negative opinion, their license to the mine goes down, and as
they accumulate positive opinion, their license to the mine goes up. Table 4.1
shows the how the license categories relate to the amount of opinion a community
agent has.
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Influence Influence is a measure of the weight given to an individual’s opinion. In the early
iteration of the model, influence varied from agent to agent, but did not vary in
time. In later versions, the network position of each agent was used to deter-
mine that agent’s influence dynamically as the model progressed. Influence, like
license, has been discretized into five categories: Dominant, Strong, Influential,
Vulnerable, and Marginal. These influence categories are also given numerical
values from -2 (marginal) to +2 (dominant) for the purposes of modeling (Ta-
ble 4.2). Influence is the driving force behind the transfer of opinion between
community agents.
Table 4.1: Opinion levels and license categories.






Table 4.2: Numerical and qualitative influence levels.






CSR agents in the primary model are actually proto-agents [50], in that they have no
internal state variables and simply act in the model as “opinion centers,” which exist to
provide the community with messages that are positive to the perception of the mine. The
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number of these agents is variable from 0 to 8, reflecting the CSR resources of the mine.
Using social judgment theory as a basis, the degree to which individual community agents
absorb the messages (opinion) provided by the CSR agents is a function of the degree to
which those individuals already agree with the message.
Figure 4.1 shows a two-dimensional Euclidean topology in which these agents can in-
teract, including CSR agents (stars) and Community agents (arrowheads). The black box
in which the agents are located represents the grid environment in which agents may move
and meet each other. Agents are initially placed randomly in the space and move around
this area randomly. When an agent comes into a specified proximity with another agent,
the interaction rules dictate what the agents will do next. The space has periodic boundary
conditions, which means that if an agent leaves the space through one side of the box, they
will enter through the opposite side. This condition confines the space allowed for interaction
without imposing the superficial constraints of a physical boundary.
Figure 4.1: A simple agent-based environment
4.1.2 Interactions
There are two kinds of interaction rules in the model. The first deals with CSR-
community interactions. When a CSR agent moves into the space that is already occupied
37
by a community agent, the CSR agent “dispenses” or makes available 10 points of opinion.
This is because 10 opinion points is the minimum requirement for changing an agent’s license
by one category (Table 4.1). The community agent then decides how much of that opinion
they will accept, based on their own current license level. Table 4.3 shows the proportion
of the 10 point opinion message that a community agent will accept based on the license
category they fall into. The proportions in the right-hand column come from the experience
of a CSR team at a working mine, and will vary from culture to culture, location to location,
and mine project to mine project. The colors in Table 4.3 are used to show the license level
of agents shown in Figure 4.1. Care should be exercised in determining these percentages for
different stakeholder groups involved with different projects in different areas of the world,
as the local contextual percentages may vary depending on local social and cultural values.
Table 4.3: Absorption of CSR messages by license category






An example of what this table shows is that a “neutral” community agent (upon meeting
with a CSR agent) will accept 60% of the 10 point opinion being offered, and their own
opinion variable will increase by 6 points. If 6 opinion points added to their previous opinion
level is enough to move them to a different license category (Table 4.1), then their license
variable will also change to reflect their new opinion.
The second kind of interaction is a community-community interaction. When one com-
munity agent moves into a space occupied by another community agent, the agent with the
higher influence level will affect the other agent’s opinion depending on the relative license
and influence levels of the two agents. The actual amount of opinion absorbed by the inter-
acting agents is driven by the difference in influence, and the directionality of the opinion
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(positive or negative) is determined by the differences in license. The proportions of accepted
opinion between agents of any two license levels are shown in Table 4.4. Just like Table 4.3,
these proportions were determined through the experience of a CSR team, and are subject
to the same constraints on applicability.
Table 4.4: Community-community interaction proportions
Dominant Strong Influential Vulnerable Marginal
Dominant 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Strong 0% 25% 50% 75%
Influential 0% 25% 50%
Vulnerable 0% 25%
Margnial 0%
This type of interaction is best understood through an example. Consider two community
agents—agent i and agent j—that have the variable profiles shown in Figure 4.2.
Agent: i Agent: j
Influence: 2 (Dominant) Influence: 1 (Strong)
License: -2 (High Blocker) License: 2 (High Supporter)
Figure 4.2: Community-community two agent interaction
When agent i and agent j meet, they will exchange opinion according to the following
equation:
For Ii > Ij
{
∆xj = 0.25 |Ii − Ij| sgn (Li − Lj)X
∆xi = 0
(4.1)
where ∆xi is the change in opinion of agent i over a given timestep, t is the timestep, Ii is the
numerical influence value for agent i, Li is the numerical license value for agent i at a given
timestep, and X is the amount of opinion available for transfer during that interaction (in this
case, 10 points). What this equation means is that the magnitude of the change in opinion
of agent j over a given timestep is equal to 25% of the total difference in influence of the two
agents, multiplied by the amount of available opinion for that step. The directionality of
the opinion is determined by the sign of the difference in license level of the two agents. So,
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when agent i and agent j meet, agent i will make 10 opinion points (X) available to agent j,
and agent j will accept 25% of the difference in influence levels (0.25× 10× (2− 1) = 2.5).
The sign of the difference in license is negative (−2 − 2 = −4), which means that overall,
agent j will adjust its internal opinion variable by -2.5 points. If -2.5 opinion points added
to agent j’s previous opinion level is enough to move agent j to a different license category
(Table 4.1), then j’s license variable will also change to reflect the new opinion. Note that in
this early iteration of the model opinion only flowed one direction; agent j absorbed some of
agent i’s opinion, but agent i absorbed none of agent j’s (∆xi = 0). This will be addressed
later in this chapter with the addition of a reciprocity variable.
4.1.3 Output
One of the outputs of the primary model is a graph that shows the total number agents
with each license level. By running different cases (different numbers of MSC agents), it is
possible to get an idea of the relative number of time-steps it takes for the community to
reach a consensus. The output of one run is shown in Figure 4.3.


















Figure 4.3: Model output, 1 CSR agent initial condition
This figure shows the emergent trend of changing the license level of the entire community
from high blocker to high supporter. In the beginning, most agents are high blockers, which
is seen by the height of the red line. Over time, cumulative license changes from high blocker
(red) to blocker (orange) to neutral (yellow) to supporter (green) to high supporter (blue).
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There is a transition time associated with the number of timesteps it takes for most people
to go from high blocker to high supporter (the portion of the graph between the black lines).
With one CSR agent, the transition time is about 6000 timesteps. Figure 4.4 shows the
same output, but with a much shorter transition time (aproximately 1000 timesteps). This
corresponds with having a higher number of CSR agents in the interaction space, which
significantly drives down the transition time.


















Figure 4.4: Model output, 8 CSR agent initial condition.
4.1.4 Initial Case Studies
In order to understand the emergent behavior and as a means verifying the internal
consistency of the model, several “what-if?” scenarios were run by changing specific variables
and analyzing the results. In the first case, the number of CSR agents was varied from one
to eight to determine the marginal benefit of adding more agents. The results were expected
to show diminishing returns, consistent with the real-world allocation of the type of resource
that the CSR agents represent.
A thousand runs were made for each case (1-8 MSC agents) in order to statistically
verify the results. Because the model was run a thousand times for each case, the number of
timesteps that it would take to reach consensus was expected exhibit a normal distribution.


























Figure 4.5: Comparative histogram results.
In Figure 4.5, the bins represent the number of timesteps it took for each run to reach
consensus. The frequency is the number of times that the runs reached consensus in a given
bin value. One of the interesting features of these histograms is that each run shows the
expected normal behavior. What vary between cases is the average time it takes to reach
consensus and the scale of standard deviations. With one CSR agent, the average time to
consensus was 20,271 time-steps. Two CSR agents bring the average time down to 9,965
time-steps; a 50.8% savings in time. The time is further reduced by adding a third and fourth
CSR agent, but after the fourth CSR agent, the benefit becomes much smaller, dropping
to a 3% marginal savings in time. In other words, adding a fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth
CSR agent does not decrease the number of time-steps enough to justify their use. This
diminishing return can further be seen by the exponentially decreasing height of the curves
in Figure 4.5.
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The second scenario that was run was a variation on the initial condition comparison
mentioned above. Three sets of initial conditions were run. The first was based on data
from a real project wherein most of the community members start out as high blockers (case
4.1.1). In the second scenario, all of the community members were initially high blockers
(case 4.1.2). In the third, all of the community members start out neutral (case 4.1.3).
The result shows a decaying trend, which would be expected based on the analysis of the














































Figure 4.6: Initial conditions comparison: diminishing returns.
The decreasing marginal benefit can be seen quite clearly in Figure 4.6. In each case,
the benefit of adding more than four CSR agents is significantly smaller than that gained by
adding the first three. This information is useful since each CSR agent represents a cost to
the mine that could be used elsewhere. The diminishing returns shown by these figures also
provide some validation of the model, since they clearly show the model producing results
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that are consistent with expected, real-world behavior.
4.2 Model Enhancements
The model presented in the above section serves as a primary basis from which to build
more complexity into the model. In order to build on this basis, it is important to identify any
potential deficiencies of the original model so that the model can be continuously improved.
The first (and most simple) of the improvements to be made is the exclusion of CSR agents
from the model. Since these agents were “proto-agents” that did not have internal variables
or change their state, it was impossible for the community to change the opinion of the CSR
agent. This represents a situation in which a mine is trying to dictate terms to a community,
instead of being one of the many stakeholders in a community’s development. In order to
give the mine itself the ability to change and adapt based on the social license level of the
community, the CSR-agents that represented the mine were replaced by a single community
agent with a high license level (the mine should endorse what it is doing) and a high degree of
influence (based on the resources and interest that it brings to the community). This means
that in future iterations of the model, the mine becomes just one (albeit very powerful)
member of a larger community that can change its behavior based on the overall license of
the larger stakeholder group (see chapter 2).
4.2.1 The Problem of Consensus
One of the main improvements to be made in the preliminary model deals with the
problem of consensus. Because of the way that the first model was set up, two issues are
immediately apparent: (1) the community always comes to consensus, and (2) the consensus
is always in favor of the mine (all agents become high supporters). In real life, however, the
community does not always act as one body, and mining projects are not always able to
resolve disputes. Additionally, since it is not practically feasible or even necessarily desirable
to make everyone a high supporter, some definition must be employed to determine what
qualifies as a consensus. A working definition of consensus used in the enhanced model is
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that most of the agents must have a similar opinion level for most of the time. In other
words, a consensus is reached when the majority of the community members consistently
fall within one social license category for the majority of the time. It is important to note
that this definition of consensus will not always be reached. In some cases, the model trends
toward a local equilibrium in which the number of agents in each category of social license
becomes relatively stable. Figure 4.7 shows what this steady-state looks like. Note that even
though there is variation in the number of agents in each category, the system will clearly
not change drastically unless it is perturbed from the outside (i.e. by the addition of more
community agents with a specific license level). This state is what constitutes an equilibrium
stopping condition, or a condition wherein “consensus” will not be reached.
The definition of consensus and equilibrium takes care of the second issue listed above,
but not the first. In order to overcome the first issue, it was necessary to develop a model
that adequately reflected the way that opinion is transferred in real life. This behavior is
more adequately modeled with the addition of a variable called “reciprocity”.
4.2.2 Reciprocity
In the first iteration of the model, opinion always flowed from agents of high influence to
agents of low influence with no mechanism for the two-way exchange of opinion. In real world
terms, this would be equivalent to one person’s opinion being completely dictated to them by
another person, without the ability to have any effect on the other person’s opinion. In the
model, this is illustrated by the asymmetry of the original opinion matrix (Table 4.4), which
shows a nonzero amount of opinion transferred from high to low influence (the top half of
the matrix) and an unpopulated bottom portion of the matrix which represents the transfer
of opinion from low back to high influence. In real human interactions, there is some level of
give-and-take as both people in a conversation may have their opinion changed. The extent
to which the higher influence person accepts opinion from the lower influence person is called
reciprocity. In the model, the bi-directionality of opinion exchange happens through the use
of a “reciprocity” variable, which determines the degree to which opinion flows from agents
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Figure 4.7: License levels at a steady-state
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of low influence to agents of high influence. This means that when two agents meet, the high
influence agent will transfer opinion to the low influence agent, but in return will share some
proportion of the transferred opinion, the gain or loss of which will also be determined by the
relative “license” variable of both agents. The bi-directional flow of opinion is summarized
in Table 4.5, in which N represents a percentage, which can then be varied in the model in
order to understand the effect of relative influence on the overall system.
Table 4.5: Bi-directional opinion diffusion matrix.
Dominant Strong Influential Vulnerable Marginal
Dominant 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Strong N × 25% 0% 25% 50% 75%
Influential N × 50% N × 25% 0% 25% 50%
Vulnerable N × 75% N × 50% N × 25% 0% 25%
Marginal N × 100% N × 75% N × 50% N × 25% 0%
The mathematical expression for the bi-directional interaction scheme is shown in equa-
tion 4.2, wherein the symbols are the same as equation 4.1 with the addition of N, which
represents the “reciprocity” multiplier.
For Ii > Ij
{
∆xj = 0.25 |Ii − Ij| sgn (Ai − Aj)T
∆xi = −N∆xj
(4.2)
This update enhances the example interaction from Figure 4.2. With an example reci-
procity of 50% (N = 0.5), the opinion transferred to agent j is the -2.5 points as above. In
this instance, however, agent i gains 50% of the 2.5 points offered (1.25 points), and the
sign of the difference in license denotes the side of the opinion spectrum that agent i is
moved toward. This enhancement allows for the realistic possibility of a high influence agent
changing their opinion through interaction with many agents of lesser influence.
4.2.3 Case Study: Absolute Consensus Model
A case study was performed in order to verify the internal consistency of the model and
provide a level of validation. This case study examined the effects of reciprocity on the time-
averaged distribution of agents, as well as the time it took to reach consensus. Two cases
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were run using different initial distributions of 100 agents over both the influence and license
variables. The initial distributions are shown in the bubble charts in Figure 4.8 in which the
x-axis represents the possible influence values (marginal, vulnerable, influential, strong, and
dominant), the y-axis represents the possible license values (high blocker, blocker, neutral,
supporter, and high supporter), and the size of bubble represents the number of agents that

























Figure 4.8: Initial license/influence agent distributions
These cases represent conditions in which agents are uniformly distributed over influence
categories and bimodally distributed over license categories (Figure 4.8(a)), or agents are
uniformly distributed over the entire parametric space (Figure 4.8(b)). The first set of results
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(seen in Figure 4.9) show the time and run-averaged distribution of agents that occurs with

























(b) Run averaged distribution from uniform initial condi-
tions
Figure 4.9: Time averaged distributions
These results show several interesting features. First, they show that the model tended
toward a neutral consensus for both sets of initial conditions. We know this because of
the way that agents of all influence categories are only in the neutral license category in
Figure 4.9(a), and normally distributed with a peak centered over the neutral license category
in Figure 4.9(b). The second piece of information that these figures show is that because
the figures are time averaged over each run, we know that the models spend approximately
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the same proportion of the overall run-time in this distribution state. The time-averaging
over runs means that what is shown is not only the final outcome, but the distribution-state
that the model was in for the majority of the run. This is further illustrated in Figure 4.10,
which shows the output of a typical model run for each set of initial conditions. Note
that the number of high blockers and high supporters (red and blue lines) are consistently
close together and tend toward zero relatively quickly, and that the number of blockers and
supporters (green and orange lines) are also close together and decrease over time, while the
number of neutral agents (yellow line) increased until all agents are neutral.
The third feature of interest that Figure 4.9 shows is the difference in the average
distribution-state between the two sets of initial conditions. In Figure 4.9(a), there is a
much higher peak over the neutral category than in Figure 4.9(a). The reason for this is
shown in Figure 4.10, which shows that for the uniform distribution case (Figure 4.10(b)) the
number of non-neutral agents goes down quickly, while in the bimodal case (Figure 4.10(a)),
the number of blockers and supporters first increase as high blocker and high supporter
agents transition to these license categories, and then decrease as those agents transition
again from blocker/supporter to neutral. The overall effect of this transition is that there
are more non-neutral agents for a higher proportion of the run time, resulting in the slightly
more widely distributed license categories shown in Figure 4.9(b).
The other factor of interest is the effect that variable reciprocity has on the model results.
Of note is the fact that the overall time-averaged distributions over license categories does not
change as reciprocity varies from 1 to 100%. What does change, however, is the timescale.
Figure 4.11 shows the relationship between reciprocity (up to 50%) and time to consensus
for both initial distribution cases.
The variables exhibit an exponential decay relationship, in which low values of reciprocity
have a large effect on the time to reach consensus, but the effect is diminished exponentially
as reciprocity increases. The minimum time to consensus occurs around 30% reciprocity.
The nature of this decay is such that a reciprocity of 30% will yield the same outcomes in
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(a) Number of agents in each social license category for bimodal initial condi-
tions
(b) Number of agents in each social license category for uniform initial condi-
tions























Figure 4.11: Timesteps to consensus with variable reciprocity
roughly the same amount of time as 50 or 100% reciprocity for these two specific sets of
initial conditions. A real-world interpretation of this result is that the willingness of high-
influence agents to accept the opinions of low-influence agents with whom they interact has
a large impact on the amount of time it takes the stakeholder group to reach a consensus,
but after a certain level the willingness to accept opinion has a diminishing impact on the
time to consensus. In other words, a fairly low level of “open-mindedness” in a stakeholder
group is much more likely to cause consensus (and do it quickly) than a “closed-minded”
stakeholder group, though the rate at which consensus is reached becomes less effected by the
“open-mindedness” of the group as receptivity increases. In future, other initial conditions
case should be tested in order determine whether all sets of initial conditions will exhibit the
behavior of this family of curves.
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CHAPTER 5
AGENT-BASED MODEL OF STAKEHOLDER NETWORK
The opinion diffusion model can yield information about the social license of a stakeholder
group when not only the license held by individual stakeholders, but also the relationships
that exist between stakeholders are examined. This is done by adding algorithms related
to the creation and maintenance of network relationships, which build upon the complexity
already present in the opinion diffusion model. The two primary reasons for adding network
relationships to the diffusion model are to improve the assumptions of arbitrary influence
levels in order to make a more realistic simulation, and because the structure of stakeholder
networks is thought to be related to the durability of the SLO. This chapter is about the
durability of the SLO. Future work will be directed at examining hos network structures
affect the diffusion of opinion and the SLO level. We will first discuss some metrics used in
network analysis, before moving on to the actual network model.
5.1 Network Analysis
ABM produces complex and emergent behavior from simple interaction rules. The com-
plex behavior itself can be very wide in scope, ranging from social cooperation [81], to
physical erosion of soil [82], to flocking patterns of birds [83]. Because of the breadth of
possible applications of ABM, it is necessary to call upon a wide range of analytical tools in
order to understand and interpret the variety of behavior observed. In chapter 4 statistical
tools were used for the analysis of license and influence distributions. Statistical analysis will
continue to be employed, but as the complexity of the model builds, the need for additional
analysis tools also builds. Before we can discuss the various metrics available for network
analysis, we must first look at what networks are, what kind of networks exist, and how the
graphical and numerical representations of networks relate to real-world information.
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5.1.1 Network Characteristics
Networks are the result of the relationships that people or agents form. Because humans
are social animals, and because it is not possible to socialize with every single other human
being, we prioritize and categorize relationships in order to perform necessary tasks. Because
of the variety of tasks that exist, people have a variety of networks that they can leverage to
perform a given task. Maslow’s famous hierarchy of human needs is an example of a system
that categorizes the priorities of human beings, from which tasks may be extrapolated (see
Figure 5.1). For instance, physiological needs include food and water, which necessitates the
collection of these resources from the environment. It is possible for a single person to meet
these physiological needs for themselves, but it is more efficient for several people to perform
different portions of the overall task for everyone else within a group. Such division of labor
is not possible without the existence of social networks, as it requires multiple people doing
multiple tasks in order to benefit themselves and each other. Through the formation of a
survival network, people are able to spend less time meeting their basic physiological needs,
and more time can be spent on meeting higher needs, such as love, belonging, esteem, and
self actualization. For each of these needs, people form a different kind of network, often
with different people.
One of the fundamental questions that must be asked when analyzing a personal network
deals with what kind of network it is, or what kinds of relations the ties represent. There
are two basic types of network: formal and informal. Formal networks are networks for
which there is a rigid structure that is formally agreed upon by participating members,
while informal networks are more fluid, and often rely on unspoken trust and assumptions
of the participants. A business is an example of a formal communication network, in which
an employee must understand who they report to, and who reports to them. It is important
to point out that members of a network do not necessarily have knowledge of all of the
connections that exist within the network, but do have knowledge of their own connections.
A friendship network is an example of an informal network, in which there are less rigid rules
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Figure 5.1: Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.
for participation that are known to a greater or lesser extent by the participants.
One thing that is immediately obvious upon examination of these types of network is that
the same group of participants may have multiple kinds of structures. Kinship networks,
for example, may have a rigid structure in which participants are even titled according to
their place within the network (mother, father, sister, brother), but participants may have a
much more informal, nuanced, and fluid structure when it comes to who confides in whom,
or which participants interact with each other. A friendship network is informal, in that
the rules for interaction vary from participant to participant, but each participant knows
exactly who they consider friends, as opposed to acquaintances, strangers, or enemies. This
also highlights the fact that networks may be asymmetrical, in that there may be differences
in the value placed on a relationship by two participants, if they even both acknowledge the
relationship at all.
In order to look more closely at the structures and properties of networks, graph the-
ory was developed as a way of approximately quantifying and analyzing existing networks.
Mathematically, networks are represented by graphs and matrices. Network graphs consist
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of nodes and edges (also called links, arcs, and ties) as shown in Figure 5.2. These graphs
make it possible to visualize the importance of specific nodes, or agents, and relationships,
as well as clustering and other structural features.
Links
Nodes
Figure 5.2: Example Network Graph
Network graphs can also be represented numerically through the use of an adjacency
matrix such as the one shown in Figure 5.3. Each row and column in the matrix represents
a node in the network and the relationships between nodes are given a numerical score in
the appropriate matrix index. Whether or not a relationship exists between two nodes is
represented by the presence or absence of a non-zero value in the matrix space that represents
the potential relationship. For example, if node three has a relationship with node four, then
the position a3,4 in the matrix will be filled with a non-zero value. In the most simplistic
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case, the position will simply be filled with a one. This case is called a binary matrix, in
which values in each index will either be a zero if there is no relationship or one if there
is. The binary matrix gives information about where there are relationships, but not about
the strength of those relationships. When mapping out a kinship network, for example, the
relationship that children have with their parents will be represented as exactly the same
strength as the relationship that the children have with their aunts and uncles. Further
information can be coded into the adjacency matrix if it is made to be non-binary—that
is, if there is a range of values that are allowable for each index. This allows for nodes to
have varying strength in their relationships and adds a level of nuance to the analysis of the
network.
a1,1 · · · a1,n... . . . ...
am,1 · · · am,n

Figure 5.3: Adjacency Matrix
Another feature of a network graph is whether the edges are directed or undirected.
An undirected edge is one that represents a reciprocal, or two-way, relationship. This is a
relationship in which both nodes report having a relationship with each other, or in which
some kind of network traffic is allowed to flow in both directions between nodes. The
notion of network traffic will be discussed in a later section. A directed edge is employed
when self-reporting or traffic flow reveals a one-way relationship between two nodes. These
features (directed or undirected edges) can also be seen in the matrix representation of the
network. An adjacency matrix is said to be symmetric when ai,j = aj,i In other words, if
every relationship is completely reciprocated, then the adjacency matrix will be symmetric.
Otherwise, it will be asymmetric. Figure 5.4 shows some simple examples of binary, non-
binary, symmetric, and asymmetric matrices. These distinctions become very important
when dealing with the mathematics behind some of the metrics used in analyzing networks.
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(a) Binary Sym. (b) Binary Asym. (c) Non-binary Sym. (d) Non-binary Asym.
Figure 5.4: Matrix graphs for binary, non-binary, symmetric, and asymmetric adjacency
matrices
5.1.2 Metrics
Just like for physical systems, there are a large number of metrics that may be used to
measure different network features. Also similar to physical systems, the metric to be used
depends on what measurement will give information about the property in question. For
example, some of the metrics that could be used to measure a physical object include mass,
density, height, width, depth, chemical composition, elasticity, etc. All of these properties
are important characteristics of the object, but if the question being asked is, “can I carry
this on my back,” then mass and dimensional measurements are likely the only ones that are
important. In graph analysis, there are also many different ways describe the characteristics
of a network [84, 85]. In this work, however, we will only discuss the metrics that are most
relevant to the question of social license durability. Some of these metrics will be used to
assess the characteristics of the networks that result from the model, while others will play
an important role in the actual dynamics of the model.
The first metric to be discussed deals with the “cohesion”, or connectedness of a group of
nodes. Like dimensionality of physical objects, there are actually several sub-measures that
may be used to define the cohesiveness of a group. Density, reciprocity, and clustering are all
considered to be aspects of a group’s overall cohesiveness. Cohesion measures are sometimes
estimated differently depending on the characteristics of the network (binary, non-binary,
58
symmetrical, asymmetrical).
“Density” in a binary network refers to the number of edges that exist in a system
compared to the total number of links that it is possible for the system to have. In a valued
(non-binary) network, density is defined as the sum of all the values of the edges divided
by the possible number of links. The number of links and the sum of the values of the
edges in a network can be easily assessed from the graph or the adjacency matrix. The total
number of links possible is found by Et =
n(n−1)
2
for undirected (symmetric) graphs, and
simply Et = n(n− 1) for directed (asymmetric) graphs, where Et is the number of possible
connections, and n is the total number of nodes. Table 5.1 shows the density equations for
these four different scenarios. In these equations, ρ is the network density, E is the total
number of edges that exist, and n is the total number of nodes.
Table 5.1: Density equations for binary/valued and symmetric/asymmetric adjacency ma-
trices
Binary
Symmetric ρ = 2E
n(n−1)
Asymmetric ρ = E
n(n−1)
Non-binary








“Reciprocity” is the extent to which edges are directional. With binary data, reciprocity
represents a binary choice; edges are either directed (ai,j = aj,i = 1) or they are undirected
(ai,j = 1, aj,i = 0, or vice versa). With non-binary data, there is the third possibility
that ai,j = raj,i, or in other words, that the links between nodes are bi-directional, but
not necessarily equivalent. In the network model—the details of which will be discussed
later—reciprocity is considered to be a variable, which is dependent upon the flow of opinion
between agents.
“Clustering” is the extent to which a network can be broken down into sub-networks, or
the tendency for nodes to form smaller cliques that are only attached to the larger network
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through a few “bridging” links. This is a structural feature that can be quantified by use of
a clustering coefficient. The clustering coefficient can be thought of as the probability that
two randomly selected neighbors of a given node are connected to each other, or the average
density of neighborhoods within the overall graph. These densities can either be weighted
by the relative size of the neighborhood, or simply counted as they are.
The next network metric is called “centrality”, and it deals with the importance of each
individual node. There are several ways to calculate centrality, and the appropriate method
depends largely on the flow of traffic through the network. Borgatti details a useful typology
for determining what type of flow is occurring in a network by first defining what type of
traffic is being transferred between nodes, and then by the allowed trajectories of traffic
[86]. There are several categories of flow networks, and it is important that the right kind of
centrality measure is used for the right kind of network. The kind of network is determined
in this paper according to two dimensions: mechanics of diffusion and trajectory. The first
dimension is based on whether traffic (information, money, whatever is moving through the
system) is divisible, and if divisible, whether it travels in series or parallel. For example, a
book can only be held by one person at a time, and so is indivisible, whereas information
can be in multiple places at once (divisible) and the way that it reaches other nodes depends
on whether it is transmitted serially (as in a conversation between two people) or in parallel
(as in a broadcast). Figure 5.5 shows a typological flow-sheet for determining the kind of
traffic that is flowing in a network.
The second dimension is related to the trajectory of traffic, which deals with decisions
about when a specific link can be traveled. There are four different types of trajectories:
Geodesics, Paths, Trails, and Walks. They are best illustrated using an examples:
Geodesic Traffic flows to a predetermined destination: I don’t have my sister’s phone
number (a direct link) but I need to get information to her as efficiently as
possible, so I give the information to my mother, who gives the information to












Figure 5.5: Traffic distinctions
shortest path (as opposed to giving the information to my brother to give to my
mother to give to my sister).
Path Traffic can flow in an undirected way, but no node or link is used more than one
time: A good example of a path trajectory is a virus that spreads from node
to node, but cannot reinfect an already infected node (and thus, also cannot
traverse an already used link). Figure 5.6 shows a serial path in which a virus
(green square) travels through a network, nodes become infected, and nodes and
links are not repeated.
Trail Traffic flows in an undirected way and nodes can be repeated, but not links: A
used book is given from node a to node b, and then to node c. Node c can then
give the book back to node a, not knowing that a has already had it. Node a
can pass the book on again, but not to node b, because a knows that b already
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Figure 5.6: Serial path
had it. Figure 5.7 shows a transfer trail in which a book (green square) travels
through a network, and links are not repeated.
Figure 5.7: Transfer trail
Walk Traffic flows in an undirected way and both nodes and links can be repeated:
Money is a good example of traffic that follows a random walk, in that giving
money to another person (in exchange for a good or service) does not mean that
that person cannot give the same physical money back to you (in exchange for
a different good or service). Figure 5.8 shows a parallel walk in which money
(green square) travels through a network, and links and nodes are repeated as
money changes hands.
Figure 5.9 shows a typological flow-sheet for determining trajectory of traffic that is flowing
in a network.
The reason it is important to determine the type of flow that is represented by a given
network is because many centrality measures have been devised for use only with specific
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Figure 5.9: Trajectory distinctions
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types of networks. Eigenvector centrality, for example, is only intended for parallel walks on
binary, non-directed networks, but is often misapplied to other types of networks [87–89].
Choosing the most relevant centrality measure is important because these measures form
the mechanism for dynamic influence in the next network version of the model. As will
be shown in the discussion on the development of the network model, the type of traffic
flow of interest in this work is the serial walk, as social license is a divisible package that
can revisit nodes and links, and agents are more likely to meet one-on-one than as a group
in a given timestep. Unfortunately, there is not a measure specifically designed for the
serial duplication of traffic in a random walk, and therefore the three centrality measures
designed for the closest analogue – parallel walks – must be examined in order to determine
the measure that is most appropriate to the modeling situation. Those three measures are
Freeman closeness, Freeman degree, and Bonacich eigenvector centrality.
Freeman closeness centrality is a measure of the distance between a given node and
each other node. It is calculated by averaging the geodesic distances between one node and
all others. The smaller the closeness centrality score, the more important, central, or well
connected the node is considered to be. The major assumption of this method of centrality
measurement is that the trajectories are geodesic. The reason it can also be applied in
parallel walks is that all trajectories are assumed to be followed simultaneously, including
the shortest. It is not appropriate for serial walks, however, in which all trajectories are not
traveled simultaneously, and the geodesic path is not representative.
Eigenvector centrality is more mathematically complex, and it is therefore more difficult
to determine the propriety of the measure for a given task. Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors
are most typically used in as a way of interpreting stresses and other physical phenomena as
well as differential equations using the techniques of linear algebra. In network applications,
eignevectors are used to interpret the importance or influence of a given node based on the
position of that node in the overall network, again using the techniques of linear algebra.
The eigenvector centrality score for a given node is calculated from the general eigenvalue
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equation (5.1), wherein A is the adjacency matrix, x is an eigenvector, and λ is an eigenvalue.
Ax = λx (5.1)
For an n×n adjacency matrix, there exist n eigenvalues that satisfy the general eigenvalue
equation, each with its own associated eigenvector of length n. The eigenvector associated
with the largest eigenvalue (the principle eigenvector) is chosen as the centrality eigenvalue
because all the entries of the principle eigenvector will be real and positive under certain
conditions. Specifically, the Perron-Frobenius Theorem states that:
1. If M is an n × n nonnegative primitive (irreducible) matrix, then there is a largest
eigenvalue λ0such that
(a) λ0is positive
(b) λ0has a unique (up to a constant) eigenvector v1, which may be taken to have all
positive entries
(c) λ0is non-degenerative
(d) λ0 > |λ|for any eigenvalue λ 6=λ0
What this means is that the principle eigenvalue for an adjacency matrix will be positive
and real, as will its associated eigenvector. For this to be true, however, the adjacency matrix
must be irreducible, i.e. it must represent a strongly connected graph. The eigenvector
centrality score for a given node, i, is simply the value of the ith index of the principle
eigenvector.
For symmetric adjacency matrices, the process of calculating the eigenvector centrali-
ties is fairly straightforward. For asymmetric matrices, however, knowing what the target
eigenvector is requires further analysis of the network, sinceAx ≡ xA if and only if A is
symmetric. This means that the eigenvalue problem will have eigenvalue and eigenvector
solutions for both cases (Ax = λx and xA = λx), which means that there will be both right
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side and left side eigenvectors. Whether the right or left eigenvector is desired depends on
what is determined to be important. The meaning of the left and right eigenvectors depends
largely on the meaning of the links in the system. If, for example, a link from node i to
node j means a nomination of popularity, then the left eigenvector will properly capture the
importance of node j because the left eigenvector represents the proportion of directed walks
that terminate on a node. If, on the other hand, a link from node i to node j means that
opinion is flowing from i to j, then the right eigenvector is the appropriate measure, since
it represents the proportion of directed links that begin on a node. Eigenvector centrality
is a good measure of the global importance of a given node, but it assumes that each node
affects all of its neighbors simultaneously. It also requires that matrices be dense enough to
produce a non-trivial solution, which may be satisfied by fully developed networks.
Freeman degree centrality is the most straightforward of the three centrality measures
compared here. It consists simply of the total number of ties incident upon a node. Like
eigenvector centrality, some thought must be given to the importance of in-links vs. out-
links based on whether a node is considered to be more important as the source of traffic
or the sink of traffic. In-degree counts the number of links that are directed from any node
to the node in question. Out degree counts the number of links that are directed from the
node of interest to any other node. This measure shares some similarities with eigenvector
centrality, but whereas eigenvector centrality measures the global importance of a given
node in a network, degree centrality only counts the links to or from the nearest neighbors
of a node, and therefore only gives the local importance of a node. This localization may
sometimes misidentify the importance of a node in cases like bridging, where a node may only
have a few links, but those links may belong to much more highly connected nodes. Table 5.2
shows a comparison of the centrality scores fore each node of a simple network (Figure 5.10).
Notice how both Freeman closeness and Freeman degree give the same ordering of importance
to the nodes (remember that the lower the closeness score, the higher the centrality of the
node), whereas the right eigenvector centrality gives much more nuanced global scores for
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centrality. This shows that different nodes are weighted more heavily by different centrality






0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0

Figure 5.10: Simple network for centrality comparison
Table 5.2: Freeman closeness, Freeman degree, and eigenvector centralities for a simple
network
Nodes Freeman Closeness Freeman Degree Eigenvector Centrality
0 1.5 2 1
1 1.5 2 0.75
2 2.5 1 0.43
3 2.5 1 0.57
4 2.5 1 0.75
5.2 Agent-based Network Model
The agent-based network model is a continuation of the opinion diffusion model, but
with the added feature of network links. The addition of network links to the model allows
the model to do two things: to create a network graph of the stakeholders which can be
analyzed using the metrics described above, and to provide a mechanism for the model to
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dynamically change the influence of agents. In the opinion diffusion model, the opinion and
social license category of the agents changed as they met and interacted throughout the
course of the simulation. Changing these variables was possible through the mechanism of
differential influence: the greater the difference in influence between two agents, the more
the opinion that transferred from high to low influence agent and the more quickly the social
license category of the receiving agent would change. The network model introduces a new
mechanism that allows for the change of the influence variable throughout the simulation.
That mechanism is network centrality.
5.2.1 Dynamic Influence
Network centrality, as outlined above, can be thought of as a measure of the influence one
node has over other nodes. As such, centrality is a very natural choice for creating dynamic
influence in the model. As one agent gains and loses network connections, their level of
influence relative to other agents will likewise increase and decrease. Links from one agent
to another are both created and enhanced during the interaction step of the model, in which
opinion is offered by a one agent and accepted by another. It is helpful to think of giving
and receiving agents as opinion sources and opinion sinks, respectively. As opinion is passed
between two agents that are interacting for the first time, a directional link is created from
source node to sink node, and the newly-created link has a strength that is proportional to
the amount of opinion transferred. If two agents interact who already have a link between
them, that link is strengthened by the amount of opinion transferred within that interaction.
Freeman degree centrality was used to determine the influence of agents for several rea-
sons. The first reason is that of the two centrality measures most appropriate (footnote:
eigenvector and Freeman degree centrality) to this kind of flow network, Freeman degree
is the easiest to calculate. Because the influence of each agent has to be recalculated ev-
ery timestep, this significantly reduces the overall computation time, which is an important
consideration in computational modeling. The second reason is that eigenvector centrality
requires a sufficiently dense network in order to produce a non-trivial solution. This means
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that eigenvector centrality as a mechanism would require a “seed” network of sufficient den-
sity before the model could be run. This is problematic, because there are many existing
network structures that do not have the critical density required, and are therefore not prac-
tically able to produce a satisfactory eigenvector centrality score for the participating nodes.
While it’s true that on a fully developed network eigenvector centrality is a good measure for
each node’s global importance in the overall network, getting to the developed network using
this measure will not always work. Additionally, Freeman degree, while only a local measure
of influence, only requires the assumption that agents are aware of the connectedness of
themselves and the agent with whom they are considering an interaction, unlike eigenvector
centrality. This is a realistic assumption that is validated by the work of Kearns and others,
who have found that knowledge of the overall structure of the network is often not available
to individual nodes, while some knowledge of the network links of nearest neighbors often is
[90][91].
In order to provide continuity with the opinion diffusion model, the network model main-
tains the five discretized levels of influence outlined in chapter 4, namely: dominant, strong,
influential, vulnerable, and marginal. As a result of these categories, it is necessary to estab-
lish a maximum centrality as a reference to which the centrality of agents may be compared.
The categorization of influence based on the maximum centrality follows a linear relationship
of 20% increments. This relationship is shown in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Categorization of influence based on reference to maximum centrality
Ci ≥ 80%Cmax Dominant
80%Cmax > Ci ≥ 60%Cmax Strong
60%Cmax > Ci ≥ 40%Cmax Influential
40%Cmax > Ci ≥ 20%Cmax Vulnerable
20%Cmax > Ci Marginal
The choice for the reference point has implications in how the model runs. For instance,
the total number of links that it is possible for an agent to accumulate is simply n − 1,
meaning that each agent can form a link with every other agent except itself. This is a
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very natural choice for Cmax, as it is a static value that represents the absolute maximum
centrality that an agent can have. It assumes only that an agent has knowledge about the
size of the network. It may skew the overall distribution of agents in each influence level,
however, since it is difficult for an agent to form links to every other agent (or ever 60%
of the agents) within a reasonable amount of time, especially for larger networks. In other
words, this measure may have some scalability issues.
A better scheme for choosing max centrality is to assume that the most well-connected
node is the most dominant of the network, and make each other node’s influence level be a
reference to that of the most dominant. The most well connected node has the most social
capital of all the nodes, which makes it the most influential, having the most resources to
mobilize in favor of spreading its opinion. This scheme makes Cmax the centrality score
of the node with the highest centrality. The assumption here is that each node does not
need to know the overall size of the network, only who is the most well connected node. In
practice, this reference point may skew the results somewhat, as the first agent to have an
interaction will immediately be dominant while all other agents will continue to be marginal.
The second scheme for Cmax was chosen because it’s assumption is more plausible, and the
model with this scheme was submitted to case studies, which will be analyzed later in this
chapter.
5.2.2 Equivalent Influence
Agents who have the same influence level will not interact when they meet because the
mechanism for opinion transfer is differential influence. This can be problematic, especially
in models with a large number of agents, where the chance of meeting another agent with
the same influence level becomes much higher. Because of this, it became necessary to
create another interaction rule in which same-influence agents can still have an interaction.
This is done through the introduction of temporally localized influence; that is, influence
differentials that only occur for a single timestep. Temporally localized interactions consist
of each interacting agent picking a number from a normal distribution, and the flow of
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opinion for that interaction being proportional to this new differential. The interaction rule
is the same as in equation 4.2 from chapter 4, but the values for influence are given by the
random numbers that were generated in the timestep instead of the actual influence levels of
the agents. This simulates a situation in which two peers may sway each other to a certain
degree in a given conversation. One agent may sway the other during one interaction, and
in another interaction the roles are reversed. Because the temporary influences are drawn
from a normal distribution (as opposed to a random distribution), the amount of opinion
transferred will most probably be small, and agents will not be majorly swayed by the
opinions of their equivalently influential agents, but will be able to form network links with
them. Figure 5.11 shows the average distribution of set of agents that were initially uniformly
distributed over both the social license and influence variables (see Figure 4.8(b)). Note that
without this equivalent influence scheme (dark gray bars), the agents are distributed normally
over social license categories with a relatively high peak centered in the neutral category.
When the equivalent influence logic is implemented (light gray bars), agents still follow a
normal distribution over social license categories, but the equivalent influence logic has the
effect of shortening the peak and spreading the distribution more widely. This means that
the implemented logic acts in opposition to the high tendency of the model toward a neutral
consensus and therefore creates a higher probability of different consensus (or non-consensus
equilibrium) outcomes. This is expected, and even desirable from the modeling standpoint,
because it provides a mechanism for damping of the effects of reciprocity on the model. The
working interpretation of this result is that the bottom-up effect of peer-to-peer interactions
is to produce a more broad spectrum in social license probabilities than the top-down effect
of norms enforced by a strictly vertical influence structure.
5.2.3 Link Decay
The concept of link decay was introduced in order to balance the creation of new network
links in a model. Without decay, links are created at a rate which increases monotonically
until all agents or connected, or a consensus is reached (Figure 5.12(a)). With decay, the
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With equivalent influence logic
Without equivalent influence logic















Figure 5.11: Model outcomes with and without equivalent influence logic
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number of links will reach a stable equilibrium when the rate of formation of links is matched
by the rate of decay of the links (Figure 5.12(b)). Decay is implemented by taking away some
of the strength of each link during every timestep, which simulates the idea that relationships
will deteriorate if they are not maintained. The rate at which links decay must be calibrated
for a given network, and the overall rate of network development plays a role in the structure
of the final (consensus or equilibrium) network.
5.3 Network Evolution
The network model was subjected to a parametric study in order to test its internal
consistency and ability to recreate a desired network structure. Recall from chapter 2 that
it was hypothesized that the features of closure and core-periphery structure determine the
durability or resilience of the social license; closure, by determining the extent to which
stakeholders are connected to each other and therefore able to organize and communicate,
and core-periphery by determining the extent to which the social license of the most dominant
stakeholders represent the social license of the less dominant stakeholders. Figure 5.13 again
shows a configuration of network structures with variations in closure and core-periphery
structure proposed by Boutilier [27].
A thorough explanation of the ability of each type of structure to grant a social license
is given by Boutilier [27]. The ability of a group of stakeholders to grant social license is
largely dependent on the amount of “social capital” that is owned by the group as a whole.
Social capital, roughly defined, is the general level of goodwill held by members of a group
toward one another (ibid.). It manifests through solidarity and norm adherence, influence,
and access to information, and can be measured through the structure of the network, the
quality of relationships, and the level of shared understanding or collective feeling. In an
issues-based stakeholder group, this means that the structure of the network (closure/core-
periphery), the quality of relationships (link strength), and level of shared understanding
(shared opinion) can give some indication of the overall level of social capital owned by the
group as a whole. This is critical for social license, because the level of social capital owned
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(a) Rate of link formation without link decay










(b) Rate of link formation with link decay
Figure 5.12: Network link creation
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Figure 5.13: Stakeholder network templates from Boutilier
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by a group will directly affect that group’s ability to establish and adhere to norms such
as the initial issuance and continued ratification of the social license of either internal or
external enterprises [92–94]. The network structures from Figure 5.13 are used to determine
the different kinds of social capital available to be utilized, as well as the effectiveness of
that social capital in producing social license or consensus and norm enforcement generally.
In order for the agent-based network model to be effective in forecasting the durability of a
social license, it must be able to reproduce the these structures, which it does. Figure 5.14
shows the comparable network structures produced by the agent-based network model. Each
structure was produced by running the model with the same seed network (the central
“factions” network) and different constant values of preferential attachment and link decay.
The colors of the agents represent their social license level, while the color and direction of
the links show which way opinion is flowing, and whether the opinion that formed the link
was positive (blue) or negative (red). What follows is a discussion of the structural features
of these networks, as well as the model parameters used to produce them.
In the network model, influence is changed based on the relative number of links that
a given agent has to other agents. This means that without an initial “seed” network, all
agents have the same level of influence (marginal), and therefore will only interact through
the equivalent influence logic, which precludes some of the significant features of the model.
Having a seed network also accounts for the fact that networks of “no organization” rarely
exist, and there is usually already an existing network at the point when social license is
sought. For the tests performed here, the “factions” network at the center of the network
templates (Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.14) was used as an initial network, and the level of social
license was uniformly distributed over the agent. This type of network is characterized by
several cohesive sub-networks which are connected to each other through “bridging” agents,
that is, agents that form a link between two subgroups, even if they, themselves are not
included in those subgroups (Figure 5.15). The concepts of bridging and bonding are a good
model to describe the social dynamics of certain regions (e.g. the Altiplano of Bolivia and
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Figure 5.14: ABM network templates
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Peru), but may not be the most ideal starting point for analyzing the stakeholder network
of a different culture, in which network concepts more specific to the culture should be used
for analysis.
Figure 5.15: Initial “seed” network: factions.
The equality network (Figure 5.16) is the result of running the network model without
link decay or preferential attachment. This is a very stable configuration, in that if there is
no preference for attachment or decay of links, any seed network will come to this structure
eventually. This network isn’t completely equal3, but it is highly connected, and there is no
one agent that is more connected than another4. This type of network has a high level of
3Every node is not connected completely equally to every other node.
4There are no core or periphery agents
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social capital. Each node is easily able to communicate with every other node in order to
establish and enforce norms, including social license to operate. Because of the cohesiveness
of the group, however, agreed upon norms may be so well enforced that there is little room for
dissent; any agent with a different opinion or social license level is immediately pressured into
conforming to the collective thinking of the group. It is important to note that this analysis
as well as the other network analyses in this chapter represent an illustrative interpretation
of a translation from network structure to social dynamics.
Figure 5.16: Equality network
The committee/tribe network (Figure 5.17) is characterized by a cohesive core of agents
that is well connected to a periphery consisting of one or more levels of removal from the
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core. The way that Figure 5.17 is laid-out, agents with a higher degree of centrality are
located at the center, and less well connected agents are found further away. This makes it
easy to see the high level of connectedness of the network, and the fact that not only are the
periphery agents strongly connected to the core, but they are also fairly strongly connected
to each other. Like the equality network, norms are easily established and enforced, but the
ultimate decision of what becomes a norm is more highly dependent on the agents at the
core. It is possible to have grid-lock or disagreement within the core because core agents are
representative of the periphery agents to whom they are connected, and there may not be
complete agreement between agents in the periphery, among whom the connections are not
as dense and the social capital is not as high. As a result, this network is capable of issuing a
social license, but may be prone to internal political struggles as the core strives to represent
the interests of a well connected periphery. This network is produced in the model from the
faction-seed network when there is no decay of links and a high preference for attachment
(>90%).
A combination of no decay and extremely high preference for attachment (99%) leads
to the accountable leadership network (Figure 5.18). This network is similar to the com-
mittee network, with a strong core of densely attached agents connected to various levels of
periphery. The difference is that the periphery agents are less well-connected than in the
committee network, and the core is represented by a stronger group of agents. This type of
network can create and enforce norms, but there is a higher degree of efficiency in decision
making, since the core is able to act more autonomously. There is also a mechanism for
balance, as members of the core are accountable to the agents that they are connected to in
the various levels of periphery and there are clear channels through which members of the
periphery can make their opinions known. This type of network is able to issue and strongly
maintain a level of social license, but is also able to adapt norms and respond to outside
forces and accept new stakeholders as they enter the issue arena. A top priority of future
work will be to thoroughly analyze the SLO outcomes granted as a result of the network
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Figure 5.17: Committee/tribe network
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structure.
Figure 5.18: Accountable leadership network
The cluster network is produced from a moderately high decay rate and a high preference
for attachment (Figure 5.19). As links decay, bridging capital is lost, and cohesive groups
that were connected to each other through bridges become disconnected. This type of
network can issue social license, depending on the structure of each cluster, but license
must be obtained from each individual cluster. Norms can be enforced within clusters, but
not between clusters, and this may lead to a very fractured set of norms and opinions as
agents reject opinion that comes from outside their native cluster. The high preference for
attachment means that the cluster structures often resemble the emergent leader or exclusive
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elite structures described below. In the model, this type of network is very hard to observe,
as it often serves merely as a transitory state between becoming more or less connected as
clusters either break down further or coalesce into a larger structure.
Figure 5.19: Cluster network
When clusters do begin to coalesce into larger groups through the bridging of agents
that are more central to their native cluster, the clusters become levels of periphery and
a central core of exclusive elite emerges (Figure 5.20). These core agents represent their
periphery clusters to the larger group or the consensus of the core to their periphery clusters
depending on the directionality of opinion flow (core to periphery or periphery to core).
This means that a social license issued by the elite of such a network may not represent
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the opinions held by members of the periphery, or may be tempermental due to the easily
changeable opinions of the poorly connected periphery being dictated to the core. This is also
a transitory state in the model, as elite networks tend to evolve into either dictatorships as
one member of the elite core becomes more and more dominant or an accountable leadership
as the periphery becomes more connected, which makes the core agents all become more
influential together. The transitory nature of this structure in the model is most likely due
to the difficulty in balancing link formation with link decay, which will be another goal to
be addressed in the future research.
Figure 5.20: Exclusive elite network
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Networks with no organization are usually only encountered after a breakdown of social
capital, such as after a war or natural disaster (Figure 5.21). This type of network is
characterized by a complete lack of connection, and an inability to establish or enforce
norms. It is produced in the model by having a high rate of decay.
Figure 5.21: No organization network
When individual agents from a non-organization network begin to form connections, a
kind of social nucleation happens, as individual agents start to form seed networks, which
then grow to become global networks. With a low preferential attachment, the cluster
network is formed. With a high level of preferential attachment, agents begin to congregate
around single individuals who have the most social capital (Figure 5.22). The preference
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for attachment, as described above comes from agents seeking relative advantage over other
agents by joining with others who already have a certain level of social capital. An analogy
would be school children seeking to befriend a popular classmate in order to become more
popular themselves. When this happens, a leader emerges, who can either become a bridging
agent to increase the overall level of social capital held by the group, or enforce norms that
ensure that they continue to own nearly all of the social capital themselves, resulting in a
dictatorship network.
Figure 5.22: Emergent leader network
A dictator network like the one shown in Figure 5.23 emerges as either a connected
network with a highly attached agent breaks down, or as an emergent leader network with
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high preferential attachment becomes more connected. It is characterized by a strong core
periphery structure in which the core is comprised of a single agent. This agent may be able
to issue or withhold social license, but it is unlikely that this decision will be representative
of the opinions of the group. Norm adherence must be enforced from the top down, and
there is little possibility of a dissenting opinion going from the bottom up and becoming a
norm.
Figure 5.23: Dictatorship network
The network structures explored in this chapter were all produced by the agent-based
network model, showing the general capabilities of such a method for assessing the ability
of a group of agents to issue and maintain a level of social license. The relationship between
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the model parameters of link decay and preferential attachment and the network structures
that these parameters produce can be generally understood by inverting the networks in
Figure 5.14. As a general rule, increasing preference for attachment leads to an increased
core-periphery structure, while increasing the link decay rate decreases the closure structure
. The implications of some of the modeling variables used to produce these networks will be
discussed in the next chapter.
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In this chapter, we will discuss some of the interesting characteristics of the variables
that were used to create the structures found at the end of chapter 5. Specifically, we will
explore the stability of different network types in the model, the combination of parameters
used to create those networks, and the dependence of these on system size.
6.1 Network Stability
One of the discoveries made during the course of running the model is that different types
of network are more or less easily produced than others. For example, the equality network
and the no organization network will always be produced from a given set of parameters
(high or low levels of link decay respectively). These types of network are extremely stable,
and constitute major boundary reference points from which to compare all other networks.
Due to the nature of the variable that produces them they can emerge from any existing seed
network, and indeed are dominant in the proportion of the decay variable that will produce
them–any link decay rate above a certain point will always produce the equality network
and any link decay rate below a certain point will always produce no organization. This is
fairly intuitive, given the nature of the interactions of agents in the model.
Other structures, such as the cluster and exclusive elite networks, seem to be very tem-
peramental and transitory, only being produced by a specific combination of parameters,
and even then only a proportion of the time. The cluster network can be produced from
a mid-range link decay rate from a seed network in the top half of the network template
(Figure 5.13), but it will eventually either coalesce into a different type of network (emer-
gent leader, factions, dictatorship) or decay completely into an even less organized structure.
The exclusive elite structure can be produced from a mid-range link decay rate and a high
level of preferential attachment from a seed network that already has a small core (such as
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the committee or accountable leadership) network, but again, it will usually evolve into a
different kind of network with either a higher or lower level of organization.
Between these two extremes of stability lie the majority of network configurations: those
with a a mid-level of stability, which are self-sustaining, but only within a narrow range
of parameters. These include the emergent leader, dictator, committee, and accountable
leadership networks. These networks exhibit the ability to be produced from multiple seed
networks through a careful manipulation of link decay and preferential attachment. A useful
analogy to understand the stability of these different structures is that of energy potential,
which may have global and local peaks and wells (Figure 6.1). It appears from the work
performed that parametric potential wells exist in which some of the network structures fall.
Exclusive elite and cluster networks fall on a peak, which forces them to fall one way or the
other into either a local or global potential well. Emergent leader, dictator, committee, and
accountable leadership networks have a limited stability within a local potential well, but a
small perturbation to the system is all that is necessary to send them into a global potential
well. No organization and equality networks appear to already occupy the lowest possible
potential, hence them being the most stable network configurations produced by the model.
The finding that some network structures are more stable than others may have real-world
implications for the vulnerability of stakeholder groups that exhibit these more transitory
structures, and should be studied further in future.
6.2 Multiplicity of Variable Combinations for a Given Network
Another point of interest that was discovered is that not only are some structures more
stable than others, but there appear to be more than one combination of parameters that
will lead to a given stable structure. Figure 6.2 shows an example in which an accountable
leadership structure is produced by increasing the decay rate while decreasing preferential
attachment. Each of these structures displays features that are characteristic of the account-
able leadership template: namely, a smooth core periphery structure many ties from the









Figure 6.1: Global and local network stability wells
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(a) Accountable leadership network
(b) Alternate accountable leadership net-
work with lower preferential attachment
and higher decay rate
(c) Alternate accountable leadership net-
work with lower preferential attachment
and higher decay rate
Figure 6.2: Accountable leadership network from alternative link-decay/attachment-
preference settings
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The fact that structures can be produced from multiple combinations of parameters is a
result of the probabilistic effects that preferential attachment has on the ability to form new
links. With a higher preferential attachment, agents have a higher standard for whom they
will interact with. Agents with a higher preference will have a lower probability of meeting
another agent to bond with in a given timestep. It essentially takes the total number of
potential partners and cuts it by the number that are no longer eligible based on preference.
Because of that, it takes a greater number of timesteps for an agent to meet a suitable
partner and have an interaction. The rate of link decay, on the other hand, is static, in
that a link will take the same amount of time to completely dissolve no matter what the
preferential attachment of the agents that own it. This means that the ability of a decay
rate to contribute to the production of a given network is in its relationship to the rate of
formation of new links, which is a function of preferential attachment. The probability of
forming a given network seems to be a function of the relationship between the probability of
forming a new link (or strengthening and existing one) and the probability of losing a a link
to decay. Because the probability of forming a new link decreases as preferential attachment
increases, the probability of forming a given network also decreases as preferential attachment
increases. That is why the same type of network can be produced as preferential attachment
decreases, as long as the probability of losing links also decreases proportionally (through
the decrease of decay rate). A fairly intuitive real-world implication of this result is that
there can be a variety of factors that can be combined to produce the a given stakeholder
network. Having an understanding of some of the parameters that result in given network
outcome can make it possible for mine managers and others to forecast the durability of the
social license as the network evolves in time.
6.3 Parameter Scaling with Network Size
In addition to decay rate scaling with preferential attachment, it must also scale with
the size of the network for the same reasons. As the size of the network increases there are
more potential partners to bond with, which means that it takes fewer timesteps for agents
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to meet a partner and form a new link. Even with a higher preferential attachment, there is
still a higher probability of meeting a partner that meets the preference of threshold of any
given agent. This means that a higher rate of decay may produce the same type of network.
In other words, because link decay scales with the probability of agents finding a suitable
partner, any change in either the preferential attachment or the size of the stakeholder
network will require adjustments to the scale of the link decay rate. In future iterations of
this model, a feedback mechanism should be built in to dynamically set the decay rate in
relation to the probability for interaction, in order to increase the stability of networks that




CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
The work presented herein represents not only a major step in understanding the nature
and evolution of the social license to operate, but also the beginnings of a fertile field of
research with many avenues for exploration. Agent-based modeling has proven to be largely
beneficial to understanding some of the practical and academic questions raised by academia
and CSR practitioners, as was hypothesized. Specifically, the questions of who determines the
social responsibility of a focal organization or who qualifies as a stakeholder in a given issue or
project can be illuminated by using the agent-based network model described in this work to
explore how key agents or stakeholders emerge through the interactions of a larger group. As
individuals interact and exchange opinion, a some level of core-periphery and connectedness
emerge in the overall network. These structural features translate to a the emergence of
representative or dictatorial leadership, or of communal decision-making. Knowledge of
what kind of network structure is likely to emerge from a given set of conditions makes
it possible to identify dominant and vulnerable stakeholders, and allows CSR practitioners
to manage expectations and behave ethically and responsibly toward stakeholders who are
under-represented in the social system in which they reside. This is of particular interest to
mining and other extractive industries, who often operate in remote locations with isolated
stakeholder groups that must self-enforce any kind of social contract that exists between
community and company. Future work will include an in-depth analysis of how the dynamics
of leadership emergence (or lack thereof) affect whether or not a social license is issued, and
the extent to which that social license is representative of the overall stakeholder group.
Some of the other modeling aspects that can be explored as a result of this work include:
• A dynamic feedback system should be implemented in order to calibrate the rate of link
decay relative to the rate of link formation as the rate of formation changes. The rate of
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formation is dependent on the number of agents in the system, the level of preferential
attachment, and the distribution of influence at any given time. This probability could
be calculated at each timestep, and used to set rate of decay in order to reach a steady
network configuration in the case of the more transitory network structures.
• Other initial conditions should be tested in order to more fully understand how net-
works evolve into each category and what combinations of parameters lead to a given
evolution.
• In the current model, all agents have the same preferential attachment value which is set
for the model. A more nuanced system for the distribution of preferential attachment
should be implemented such as a normal distribution centered over the preferential
attachment value.
• A system of opinion flow through existing network links should be established in order
to more fully tie the level of social license to the network structure.
• The centrality measure used for setting agents’ influence dynamically (Freeman degree)
is limited by its scope as a local measure, but it is the most appropriate measure to
date for the type of network traffic employed by this model. More appropriate influence
measures should be implemented as they are devised
• As more stakeholder data becomes available, the model should be further validated
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APPENDIX A - MODEL INTERFACE
A discussion of each part of the user interface is included here, as well as some information
necessary to successfully import input files and initialize the model. Figure A.1 shows the
complete user’s interface as it appears upon opening the model. There are several specific
parts of the interface which will be discussed individually, including initialization, parameter
variability, feature implementation, and monitoring
Figure A.1: Model interface
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A.1 Model Initialization
Before running the model, some input is needed in order to set up agents with their
respective variables and existing network relationships. This is done by creating two separate
files: one with agent attributes, and one with the adjacency matrix (Figure A.2(a) and
Figure A.3(a)). The agent attribute file should have 4 columns. The first column is the
ID column, which starts at 0 and increases sequentially until the desired number of agents
is reached. In the example in Figure A.2(a), there are 20 agents, including agent 0. The
second column is the influence column. Because influence is determined dynamically in this
version of the model (see chapter 5), this column of the attribute file needs to be filled with
0’s as placeholders for the influence of agents which will be determined later. The numbers
in the 3rd column are numerical values that represent individual license (formerly attitude
categories), ranging from -2 (high blocker) to 2 (high supporter). This column should be
filled out using the actual license categories of the stakeholders of interest for a particular
model. The final column represents the amount of “opinion” points each stakeholder has,
which is on a 10 point scale for each license category. This means that stakeholders who are
high blockers should have a 5 in the opinion column, those who are blockers should have a
15, neutral stakeholders should have a 25, supporters should have 35, and high supporters
should have a 45.
Once the attributes table is filled out, it should be saved as a tab-delimited text file (see
Figure A.2(b)). This allows the file to be read by Netlogo, and translated into the number
of agents to be created and what each agent’s variable profile should be.
The next file to be created is the pre-existing adjacency matrix that represents the net-
work at the time that it is to be modeled ( Figure A.3(a)). Each row in the matrix represents
an individual stakeholder, and the columns represent the stakeholders that may be attached
to the row-stakeholder. For instance, if stakeholder 0 has a relationship with stakeholder 1,
then position 1,2 in the matrix should be populated with a 1. If there is a known strength
for the relationship, then the 1 is replaced by the numerical strength of the relationship.
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This matrix file should be saved as a .csv comma delimited file ( Figure A.3(b)).
Once the necessary input files are created, the names of the files are typed into the
attribute-file and network-file inputs (Figure A.4) located along the top of the Netlogo in-
terface.
There are several buttons in the upper left corner of the interface, which serve several
purposes (Figure A.5). The most important are the “setup” and the “go” buttons. The setup
button initializes the model by calling the attribute and network files, creating agents and
their profiles, and creating a network. The go button is what causes the model to actually
run. When the setup button is pressed, a one-time procedure is run that does all of the
initialization. When the go button is is pressed, the run procedure is continually carried out
until one of the stopping conditions is met or the go button is pressed again.
The “layout” buttons are used for convenience in visualizing a final network-state. When
the model is finished, the agents will be in a random configuration, which makes at-a-glance
analysis of the network difficult (Figure A.6(a)). Depending on what information is desired
and the connectedness and core periphery structure of the network, it may be convenient
to view the network in some other configuration. In the radial layout, the most highly out-
connected (most influential) agent is at the center and the other nodes are positioned radially
outward, with distance of each agent from the central node depending on the influence the
agent (Figure A.6(b)). The circle layout simply positions each agent in a circle, and can be
used for quickly seeing the overall density of the network (Figure A.6(c)). The spring layout
treats each network link as a spring that is pushing or pulling it’s end nodes together or
apart, which can be used to spread the network out in a convenient way (Figure A.6(d)).
The “divisor” input shown in (Figure A.5) is a constant that determines the “springiness”
of the network, or how closely or widely agents are clumped together. For a more spread-out
network, increase the divisor.
The last button is used to make a movie of the network evolution. When pressed, it calls
the setup procedure and a modified go procedure that saves copies of the view as the model
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(a) Agent Attributes
(b) Attribute save as text file (tab delimited)
Figure A.2: Attribute File
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(a) Adjacency Matrix
(b) Adjacency matrix save as .csv file
Figure A.3: Adjacency matrix file
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(a) Attribute file input
(b) Adjacency matrix input
Figure A.4: Inputs
progresses and compiles them into a video, so that the evolution of the network may be more
easily observed.
A.2 Varying Parameters
The sliders on the left side of the Netlogo interface are used to vary the global parameters
of reciprocity, link decay-rate, and preference for attachment (Figure A.7). For a detailed
discussion of these parameters, see chapters 5 and 6.
A.3 Features
Also on the left side of the interface are a series of toggles (Figure A.8). These are used
to turn different modeling and visualization features on or off. There are two “visualiza-
tion” features, which change the way information is displayed in the interaction view, and
three “modeling” features, which allow for different types of logic to be implemented. The
two visualization features are the “size-nodes” and “link information” toggles. “size-nodes”
allows each agent to change its size proportional to its current level of influence. The “link-
information” switch turns on and off the ability to see how strong each link currently is
(Figure A.9).
The modeling features consist of the “peers,” “influence,” and “new-seed” toggles. “Peers”




(a) Random layout (b) Radial layout
(c) Circle layout (d) Spring layout
Figure A.6: Network Layouts
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Figure A.7: Global model parameters
ter 5 of part II for details) to be turned on and off. “influence” allows the mechanism diffusion
through out-degree centrality based influence (again, see chapter 5) to be turned on an off.
“New-seed” allows for a new seed to be generated for each run, or the same random-seed
to be the basis for each run. If “new-seed” is off, then the same random numbers will be
drawn at each step and the model will always produce the same results. This feature can
be used for debugging and determining behaviors. It is strongly recommended that each of
these modeling features remain “on” for all model runs.
A.4 Monitoring
There are several plots and outputs along the lower left, bottom, and right sides of the
user interface. These allow the user to monitor the dynamics of the model as it runs. The
plots in the lower left of the interface monitor the distribution of agents over both the license
and influence parameters at any given time in the model run. In Figure A.10(a), the x-axis
is composed of numerical values for social license, with -2 being high blockers, -1 blockers,
etc. The y-axis represents the number of agents that fall into a given license category at a
given time. In Figure A.10(b), the y-axis is the same (number of agents in a given category),
but the x-axis represents the different influence categories (-2 as marginal, -1 as vulnerable,
etc.).
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Figure A.8: Model logic and visualization features
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Figure A.10: License and influence distribution monitors
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Two of the plots along the right side of the interface also allow for the monitoring of
the distributions of license and influence, but update every time-step to show the history of
how the model came to a given distribution state. Figure A.11(a) shows how the number of
agents in each license category have evolved over the course of a run, while Figure A.11(b)
shows how the number of agents in each influence category has changed. These plots make
it possible to make observations about how license and influence move relative to each other,
or if certain events cause changes in one or the other or both.
The “links” monitor on the right side of the interface shows the total number of links
present in the network at a given time-step (Figure A.12). This information may be useful
in determining the link decay rate parameter. The model output (Figure A.13) can be used
to show the adjacency matrix and the principle eigenvalue and eigenvector of the network
as the model runs.
Additional plots and monitors are easily added by following a simple procedure within





Figure A.11: Time-varying license and influence distributions
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Figure A.12: Number of network links
122
Figure A.13: Model output
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APPENDIX B - RUNNING THE MODEL
It is often desirable to make more than one run of the model with the same combination
of variables in order to determine the probability of a given set of outcomes. It is also often
convenient to “sweep” a global parameter (such as those in Figure A.7) by systematically
varying one or more parameters and running the model. This is done through the use of
the built-in feature of Netlogo called “Behavior-Space”. A simple example of how to use
behavior-space is given here.
B.1 Behavior-Space
Behavior space is accessed through the Netlogo toolbar by clicking Tools .BehaviorSpace.
This brings the user to the BehaviorSpace dialogue shown in Figure B.1 through Figure B.5.
Clicking on “New” in Figure B.1 will allow the user to define the parameters for a new set
of experiments as seen in Figure B.2. In this example, the “attachment-preference” variable
will be varied from 0 to 1 by increments of 0.1. The model will make 100 repetitions,
meaning that the model will complete 100 runs for each value of attachment-preference.
The information collected during each run is the next input in Figure B.2, in this case, the
model is counting the number of agents in each license category at the end of each run. The
commands that will be carried out for each run are simply “setup,” and “go”.
Once the experiment has been created, it is carried out by clicking “ok” from Figure B.2
and then “run” from Figure B.1. This will prompt the output dialogue shown in Figure B.3.
Checking the boxes allows the user to determine the way that output data will be displayed.
If the computer running the model has multiple processing cores, it is possible significantly
decrease computational time by running several iterations of the model in parallel. Once
those decisions are made, the user can determine where the output will be saved to (Fig-
ure B.4). The default output format is a .csv file. However, it is crucial that the user actually
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type “.csv” at the end of their file name, or the output file will become corrupted and will
not be able to be read.
After the experiment is created and the output file is setup, the model will run. A window
like that in Figure B.5 is present throughout the running of the experiment, which allows
the user to view the progress of a current run of the model by updating the view and the
plots and monitors. In order to decrease computation time, it is strongly recommended that
these boxes by unchecked, so that the model does not waste time updating the view and
monitors.




Figure B.3: Behavior-space run dialogue
Figure B.4: Save output as .csv
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Figure B.5: Behavior-space monitoring options
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